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ARTICLES
ANTITRUST AND TRADE SECRETS: THE U.S.
AND THE EU APPROACH
Katarzyna A. Czaprackat
Abstract
This paper examines the divergent approaches to application of
antitrust principles to trade secrets in the EU and in the U.S. The U.S.
antitrust enforcers recognize the need to protect trade secrets and
treat them as a type of intellectual property. By contrast, the
European Commission takes the view that trade secrets do not merit
the same level of deference as that accorded to intellectual property
rights. In Microsoft, the Commission decided that Microsoft's refusal
to disclose secret interoperability information to its competitors
constituted an abuse of a dominant position because the refusal
created an unfair competitive advantage for Microsoft. Moreover, as
the recent controversy over the implementation of the Microsoft
decision shows, the Commission position is that Microsoft does not
have the right to charge royalties or control the secret
interoperability information it was forced to disclose, unless such
information qualifies for patent protection. The source of these
divergent approaches may be the lack of harmonized EU standards of
trade secret protection. Whereas U.S. antitrust authorities naturally
relied on the harmonized principles of trade secrets law, the EU
antitrust enforcers, lacking such uniform standards, have been using
competition law to shape substantive trade secret laws. In doing so,
they have undermined national trade secret protection measures and
thus created a legal environment which may discourage private R&D
investment and impede diffusion of technologies.
t JSD, Columbia Law School; associate at White & Case LLP, New York. I am
indebted to Professor Petros C. Mavroidis and Professor Harvey J. Golsdchmid for their
comments on this paper. The paper also greatly benefited from the suggestions of Ian S.
Forrester, Partner at White & Case LLP, Brussels.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The tension at the intersection of intellectual property (IP) and
competition law has provided a fertile soil for debate. Yet, little has
been said about the application of competition rules to trade secrets.
Specific features of trade secrets and their status as a form of IP merit
closer consideration, as has become evident after the European
Commission decision in the Microsoft case1 and the litigation that
ensued.2 Should the same standards that apply to compulsory
licensing of IP apply to compulsory licensing of trade secrets? If
compulsory licensing is ordered, is the owner of the information
entitled to royalties? Does the value of the trade secrets at stake or the
degree of innovation involved matter when applying antitrust rules to
trade secrets? The European Commission faced all these questions in
the Microsoft case. The Microsoft decision also illustrates that trade
secrets are treated significantly differently by the EU antitrust
enforcers than by their U.S. counterparts. This paper is an attempt to
systematically compare and assess the application of antitrust rules to
trade secrets in the EU and in the U.S. It asserts that trade secrets
should be treated as a form of IP for the purpose of applying antitrust
laws, as is the case in the U.S., but not so in the EU.
The issue of how trade secrets should be treated for the purpose
of applying antitrust laws cannot be considered without examining
first the basic questions on the nature and economics of trade secrets,
such as how trade secrets are defined, how they differ from IP rights,
and why they deserve to be protected. These questions are discussed
in the first part of this paper. These general considerations are
followed by a brief comparison of the laws governing trade secret
protection in Europe and in the U.S. Both in the EU and in the U.S.,
trade secret protection is a matter of state or national law. However, in
the U.S. a number of measures have been taken to create standards of
trade secret protection at the federal level. There has been no similar
development in the EU.
Both in the U.S. and in the EU, "federal" antitrust rules trump
inconsistent state trade secret laws. Yet, whereas the U.S. antitrust
1. Commission Decision of 24.03.2004 relating to a Proceeding under Article 82 of the
EC Treaty (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft), COM (2004) 900 final (Apr. 21, 2004),
available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf.
2. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2004 O.J. (C 179) 36; Case T-
313/05, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2005 O.J. (C 257) 31.
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authorities treat trade secrets with the same deference as I.P. rights,
the position of EU competition policy makers is that trade secrets do
not deserve the same level of protection as IP rights. Moreover, the
decisions in which the European Commission applied competition
law to trade secrets have shaped the standards of trade secret
protection in the European Union. The Commission has adopted a
definition of what constitutes protectable know-how, decided what
the acceptable means of its exploitation are, asserted that trade secrets
are not IP, and that trade secrets do not merit the same level of
protection as IP. In doing so, the Commission was predominantly
concerned with the need to ensure free competition and less with the
need to secure the rights of the companies in their know-how. This
process, which effectively led to the establishment of trade secrets
standards for the purpose of application of EU competition law, was
erratic and marked by decisions that ignored the standards of trade
secret protection at the Member States level. As a result, the
Commission considerably undermined national trade secret protection
measures, which in turn may undermine the incentives to innovate
and impede the diffusion of new technologies. Thus, the U.S.
approach is preferable.
II. TRADE SECRETS BASICS
A. Trade Secrets Defined
Trade secrets can be broadly defined as confidential information
which has commercial value because it is secret. The World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) defines trade secrets on its
website as "any confidential business information which provides an
enterprise a competitive edge" and explains that trade secrets
"encompass manufacturing or industrial secrets and commercial
secrets." 3 The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS
Agreement"), which comprehensively addresses the issue of trade
secret protection,4 requires the WTO Member States to protect
3. World Intellectual Property Organization, What is a Trade Secret?,
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ipbusiness/tradesecrets/trade_secrets.htm (last visited July 2,
2007).
4. Article 10bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar.
20, 1883, revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 1648, 828 U.N.T.S. 306, 337 , provides for
general obligations concerning unfair competition. The first international agreement containing
an explicit provision on trade secrets protection was the North American Free Trade Agreement,
Dec. 17, 1992, art. 1711, 32 I.L.M. 675 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994).
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"undisclosed information" which (1) is secret in the sense that it is not
generally known or readily accessible, (2) has commercial value
because it is secret, and (3) has been subject to reasonable steps under
the circumstances to keep it secret by the person lawfully in control of
the information. 5 It is not required that the information is of a
technical nature; non-technical information, such as customer lists,
sales data, or business strategies, can also be protected as a trade
secret. For example, U.S. Courts have held that a recipe for chocolate
chip cookies,6 a pesticide formula,7 a scheme for an electronic board
89game, computer hardware design,9 some elements of computer
software,' and information relating to nontechnical aspects of
business such as customer lists1 qualify for protection under the trade
secret laws.
12
The TRIPS Agreement provides that trade secrets are protected
against unauthorized disclosure, acquisition, or use that is contrary to
honest commercial practices.' 3 The notion of unauthorized use
typically includes such practices as industrial or commercial
espionage, breach of contract, and breach of confidence.1 4 It does not
extend to the use of protected information by third parties who
obtained it in accordance with honest commercial practices. Still, an
5. The definition of "confidential infornation" closely resembles the definition of trade
secrets in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995). See infra Part
III(A).
6. See Peggy Lawton Kitchens, Inc. v. Hogan, 466 N.E.2d 138, 140 (Mass. App. Ct.
1984).
7. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 993 (1984).
8. See Burten v. Milton Bradley Co., 763 F.2d 461,462 (1st Cir. 1985).
9. See, e.g., Telex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machs Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 897 (10th Cir. 1975);
Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 357 A.2d 105, 110 (Del. Ch. 1975). See
also 2 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 9:2 (2006).
10. See, e.g., Telex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machs Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 318 (N.D. Okla.
1973); Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1994); Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Huawei
Techs, Co., Ltd., 266 F. Supp. 2d 551, 555-56 (E.D. Tex. 2003).
11. See, e.g., Ecolaire Inc. v. Crissman, 542 F. Supp. 196, 205-06 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Am.
Precision Vibrator Co. v. Nat'l Air Vibrator Co., 764 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. App. 1988). See also
JAGER, supra note 9, § 3:3.
12. See I ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.09 (2007); JAGER,
supra note 9, § 3:9.
13. "A manner contrary to honest commercial practices" is a standard borrowed from
Article lObis of the Paris Convention and defined in note 10 to the TRIPS Agreement as "at
least practices such as breach of contract, breach of confidence and inducement to breach, and
includes the acquisition of undisclosed information by third parties who knew, or were grossly
negligent in failing to know, that such practices were involved in the acquisition." TRIPS
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, § 7, art. 39, Apr. 15, 1994,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/27-trips_04de.htm#7.
14. Id.
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element of contractual breach is not a prerequisite for liability. A third
party who knowingly acquires the information from someone who
had earlier misappropriated it is also liable. 15 Under the TRIPS
Agreement, the obligation to protect trade secrets applies not only to
private parties, but also to public authorities dealing with trade
secrets, particularly in the context of the proceedings before courts
and administrative authorities.' 6 This principle has also been long
recognized both in the EU and in the U.S. The European Court of
Justice (ECJ) stressed the importance of trade secrets in the context of
antitrust procedure and commented that they must be "afforded very
special protection."' 17 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that trade
secret rights are protected under the Fifth Amendment Taking
Clause.
18
B. Why Do We Protect Trade Secrets and What Role Do They
Play?
The basic economic rationale for protecting trade secrets is akin
to that of protecting other forms of IP. Trade secrets provide an
economic incentive for private investment in knowledge production
by giving the means to exclude others from using that knowledge and
thus increasing the expected returns of innovation. 19 Trade secret
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Case 53/85, AKZO Chemie BV v. Comm'n, 1986 E.C.R. 1965, 28. See also
Case T-353/94 Postbank NV v. Comm'n, 1996 E.C.R. 11-921, 85-87.
18. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984).
19. A number of authors have justified the existence of trade secrets in terms of
incentives to innovate. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade
Secrets Under the Takings Clause, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 57 (2004); REGIS FABRE, LE KNOW-HOW:
SA RtSERVATION EN DROIT COMMUN [KNOW How: ITS PROTECTION UNDER COMMON LAW]] 9-
12 (1976); Gordon L. Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Street Law Imposed by Federal Patent and
Antitrust Supremacy, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1432, 1454 (1967) ("As presently developed, however,
trade secret law has no such effect: rather, it encourages invention by providing the incentive of
gaining and preserving a competitive advantage); James Pooley & Walter Bratic, The Value of
Trade Secrets, MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 66, 69 (Feb. 1999). See also David D. Friedman et al.,
Some Economics of Trade Secrets Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 64 (1991) (arguing that trade
secret is a useful supplement to patent law because it allows inventors to choose between the
two regimes an option that gives them the larger return). The same rationale for trade secret
protection was given in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1964) and in
DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 13 (Cal. 2003) ("By creating a limited property
right in information, trade secret law 'acts as an incentive for investment in innovation."')
(citation omitted). An argument that undermines this theory is that trade secret laws do not add
to the incentives to innovate because trade secrets are only available for information that could
be kept secret. If information can be kept secret through self-help, then owners will spend more
money to keep the information secret even in the absence of trade secret law. Thus, trade secret
protection does not necessarily confer an opportunity for the owner to charge more than would
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protection comes at a cost of restricting the use of information by
those who might have benefited from it had it been freely available.
Consequently, trade secret protection involves the same fundamental
policy choices between favoring innovation and favoring competition
as laws protecting other forms of IP. The tradeoff between exclusivity
and limiting competition is a function of what information is
protected, for how long it is protected, and from what sort of third
party conduct it is protected. In this context, it must be noted that to
prevail on a trade secret claim, the plaintiff must show that the taking
of the secret was improper. Trade secrets are not protected against
honest commercial practices such as reverse engineering or
independent research and development activities. Reverse engineering
is crucial in the context of trade secrets economics, as it considerably
limits the scope of exclusivity enjoyed by an owner of a trade secret.
It promotes competition in developing new products and constrains
market power.20 The possibility of reverse engineering may result in
duplicative research, but also means that protection of trade secrets,
unlike the patent system, does not encourage wasteful R&D races.
21
Aside from encouraging innovation, trade secrets also play a role
in diffusion of knowledge and commercialization of innovations.
Arguably, the ability to enforce rights in confidential information
encourages licensing and limits inefficient hoarding of valuable
know-how.22 In addition, effective remedies against trade secret
misappropriation limit wasteful expenditure on measures to secure
secrecy and allow organizing production processes in an efficient
23
manner.
be available on the open market. See Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (2007). As Risch acknowledges, the "encouragement to
innovate" rationale still applies if one were to consider a forced disclosure situation. Id. at 26-
28. As it will be seen, this is exactly the situation that may be created by application of antitrust
rules to trade secrets and its example is the Microsoft Decision discussed below.
20. See Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, Ill YALE L. J. 1575, 1650 (2002).
21. See Friedman et al., supra note 19, at 65-66.
22. See JAGER, supra note 9, § 1:4.
23. See, e.g., E. 1. duPont deNemours & Co., Inc. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016
(5th Cir. 1970) (affording protection to trade secrets prevents wasteful expenditure in trade
secret protection); Richard Posner, Trade Secret Misappropriation: A Cost-Benefit Response to
the Fourth Amendment Analogy, 106 HARV. L. REV. 461, 472 (1992) ("Although expensive
domes or other protections may be the only means of securing Fourth Amendment privacy
rights, 'courts do not require extreme and unduly expensive procedures to be taken to protect
trade secrets."'); Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or Intellectual Property Olympian? A
Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secrets Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 87 (1999)
("Information holders also might reallocate resources from other activities, including research
and development to protect existing information").
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Another rationale for trade secret protection is the promotion of
commercial ethics. 24 The Unfair Competition Act, the primary
legislation which provides for trade secret protection in Germany, is
based on a general prohibition of acts that are contrary to good morals
in the context of commercial transactions. Similarly, Irish and
English courts used equitable principles to protect confidences.2 6 In
the U.S., an often mentioned reason for trade secret protection is the
protection of the fundamental right to privacy.2 7 The U.S. Supreme
Court in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. noted that "a
most fundamental human right, that of privacy, is threatened when
industrial espionage is condoned or is made profitable. 2 8
C. Trade Secrets and IP Rights
In some legal systems, such as China, Germany, and Japan,
protection of trade secrets forms part of the general concept of
protection against unfair competition. 29 In other legal systems, such as
the United Kingdom or Australia, trade secrets are treated as a form
of confidential information and protected under the laws of
confidentiality. 30 Trade secret protection has been based on a number
of different legal theories: contract, property, fiduciary relationship,
and unjust enrichment. 31 It is unclear whether trade secrets can be
characterized as property rights in a manner similar to copyrights or
24. See JAGER, supra note 9, § 1:3. See also Don Wiesner & Anita Cava, Stealing Trade
Secrets Ethically, 47 MD. L. REV. 1076 (1988).
25. Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb [Act Against Unfair Competition], June 7,
1909, RGBI. at 499, last amended July 3, 2004, BGB1. I at 1414, § 1. See also Ustawa z dnia 16
kwietnia 1993 r. o zwalczaniu nieuczciwej konkurencji [Polish Act Against Unfair
Competition], Official Journal 1993 No 47 item, 211, Art. 3, (defining an act of unfair
competition along the same lines).
26. See, e.g., House of Spring Gardens Ltd. v. Point Blank Ltd., [1983] F.S.R. 213, 253
(Ir.); Fraser v. Evans [1969] 1 All E.R. 8 (U.K.).
27. See, e.g., Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 212 (1890); JAGER, supra note 9, § 1:5. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 39, cmt. a (1995).
28. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 489 U.S. 141, 155 (1989) (quoting
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487 (1974)). See also JAGER, supra note 9, §
1:5; JAMES POOLEY & CHARLES TAIT GRAVES, TRADE SECRETS § 1.02 [5] (2007).
29. See Protecting Trade Secrets: A Worldwide Survey, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Dec.
1997-Jan. 1998, at 40, 44-48.
30. Id.
31. See FRANC OIS DESSEMONTET, Protection of Trade Secrets and Confidential
Information, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT 243-46 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusufeds., 1998).
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patents.32 Though the TRIPS Agreement lists trade secrets among
other forms of IP, it does not choose between different theoretical
approaches to trade secret protection.33 Some commentators view
rights in trade secrets as a series of undertakings that bind individuals
who have received a trade secret in the course of a confidential
relationship.34 They submit that the duty not to disclose confidential
information results from a contractual relationship, such as an
employment contract, a license agreement, a joint-venture or a
partnership, or it is implied because parties are in a fiduciary
relationship. The source of liability is a breach of an explicit or
implicit obligation of confidence. Other commentators assert that the
protection of trade secrets is best understood in terms of proprietary
interests, by reference to the owner's right to prevent unauthorized
use and disclosure of the information. They see trade secrets as a
bundle of rights assigned to the owner, who is entitled to using,
assigning, or licensing the information that is the subject of her
rights.35 This seems to be a better way to analyze trade secrets, taken
that the contractual theory does not explain why trade secrets holders
can exercise their rights even in the absence of any contractual
32. In E. I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917),
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court, famously remarked:
The word property as applied to trademarks and trade secrets is an unanalyzed
expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law
makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs have
any valuable secret or not the defendant knows the facts, whatever they are,
through a special confidence that he accepted. The property may be denied, but
the confidence cannot be.
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1004 n.9 (1984), Justice Blackmun interpreted
this statement not as a denial that property interests exist in trade secrets, but as "determination
of the existence of that interest irrelevant to resolution of the case" and reminded that in other
cases the Court spoke of trade secrets in terms of property interests.
33. Arguably the reference to the information that is "'legitimately under the control' of
plaintiffs" and the fact that trade secrets are listed with other intellectual property rights (IPRs)
imply that the TRIPS Agreement adopts the property rights theory. See DESSEMONTET, supra
note 31, at 246.
34. See Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter
Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATI. U. L. REV. 365, 366
(1989); ALLISON COLEMAN, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS 30 (1992) (protection
of trade secrets is based on an obligation of confidence); WILLIAM CORNISH & DAVID
LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED
RIGHTS 332-34 (5th ed. 2003) (same).
35. See, e.g., MILGRIM, supra note 12, § 2.01; Sam Ricketson, Confidential Information--
A New Proprietary Interest? Part 1, 11 MELB. U. L. REV. 223 (1977); Sam Ricketson,
Confidential Information--A New Proprietary Interest? Part II, II MELB. U. L. REV. 289
(1977); Arnold S. Weinrib, Information and Property, 38 U. TORONTO L.J. 117 (1988); Epstein,
supra note 19, at 59-60; DESSEMONTET, supra note 31, at 243.
2008] ANTITRUST AND TRADE SECRETS: THE U.S. & EU 215
relationship between them and the parties using the information. Nor
does it explain the criminal liability for trade secret "theft,, 36 or the
fact that indirect recipients can be held responsible for trade secret
misappropriation.
The case for the proprietary theory is stronger in common law
jurisdictions. In Kewanee,37 the U.S. Supreme Court compared
characteristics and purposes of the law of trade secrets and patent law,
reasoning that they are both designed to encourage innovation. In
Ruckelshaus,3 8 the Court held that trade secrets, as intangible property
rights, qualified for protection under the Fifth Amendment Taking
Clause. 39 Although courts in the United Kingdom and Australia ruled
that certain confidential information can constitute property,40 there is
also some authority rejecting proprietary analysis.4 1 By contrast,
courts in civil law jurisdictions have been reluctant to recognize
proprietary interests in trade secrets. For example, French courts have
42held there are no exclusive rights in confidential information.
Similarly, the Italian legal system does not recognize erga omnes
36. In the U.S., trade secret theft is a federal crime under the Economic Espionage Act.
French, German, and Polish laws criminalize trade secret theft, see infra Part III(B)(2); so do
Italian (Art. 513, 623 Codice Penali) and Spanish laws (Section 3 of Chapter XI of the Spanish
Criminal Code).
37. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,480-84 (1974).
38. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
39. There are more cases in which courts have recognized property rights in trade secrets.
See, e.g., Carpenter v. U.S., 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987) ("Confidential business information has
long been recognized as property."); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Execuquest Corp., 691 N.E.2d 545,
546-47 (Mass. 1998) (trade secrets are property under section 93A of the General Laws of
Massachusetts, which requires a loss of property to allow for an injunction).
40. See, e.g., Herbert Morris Ltd. v. Saxelby, [1916] 1 A.C. 688 (H.L.); Markwell Bros.
Pty. Ltd. v. C.P.N. Diesels Queensland Pty. Ltd., (1983) 2 Q.R. 508; Technography Printed
Circuits Ltd. v. Chalwyn Ltd [1967] F.S.R. 307, 311 (Plowman, J., referring to "the plaintiffs'
proprietary interests by way of confidential information for which they are entitled to
protection"); Boardman v. Phipps [ 1966] 3 All E.R. 721, 745-46 ("what is called 'know-how' in
the commercial sense is property which may be a very valuable asset . . . confidential
information acquired in this case, which was capable of being and was turned to account, can
properly be regarded as the property of the trust"). See also Paul Kohler & Norman Palmer,
Qualifications upon the Proprietary Analysis, in INTERESTS IN GOODS 6-9 (Norman Palmer &
Ewan McKendrick eds., 2d ed. 1998); John Hull & Sarah Abbott, Property Rights in Secrets --
Douglas v Hello! in the Court ofAppeal, 27 EUR. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 379, 382-83 (2005).
41. See, e.g., Fed. Comm'r of Taxation v. United Aircraft Corp. (1943) 68 C.L.R. 525,
534-35 (Austl.); Boardman v. Phipps (1967) 2 AC 46, 64; Douglas v. Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2005] 4
All E.R. 128, 129. See also Kohler & Palmer, supra note 40, at 9-11; COLEMAN, supra note 34,
at 30; CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 34, at 332-35.
42. See Jean-Pierre Gasnier et al., France, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW: EUROPEAN JURISDICTIONS 197 (Dennis Campbell & Susan Cotter eds., 1995), citing the
judgments of the Paris Court of Appeal of 3 July 1975 (Gaz. Pal. 1976, 1, 43) and the judgment
of the Cour de Cassation of 3 October 1978 (JCP 78 6d. G., IV, 332).
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rights in confidential information.43 The civil law concept of a
property right is strictly defined: the right exists, in accordance with
the principle of numerus clausus, only when it has been created by
law.44 Thus, trade secrets have been described as "de facto assets" or
"incomplete IPRs" or "subjective rights" (subjective Rechte, droit
subjective).45 Though the legal theories on which the protection of
trade secrets is based may differ, all industrialized countries provide
strong protection for trade secrets.
Trade secrets have features which make them different from IP
rights. There is no scheme for trade secrets registration or publication.
They exist irrespective of their acknowledgment by the State or even
broader public. Consequently, information protected as a trade secret
is not scrutinized for its originality or innovativeness. Indeed, it is not
required that trade secrets meet high standards when it comes to
originality or innovativeness. Furthermore, whereas copyrights and
patents encourage sharing of the results of creative efforts, trade
secret owners need to keep the information secret to benefit from
protection. Trade secret protection is somewhat limited in comparison
to that afforded by other types of IPRs: they do not afford exclusive
rights and are vulnerable to accidental discovery and reverse
engineering. Still, all these aspects of trade secrets law are not unique.
Copyrights, for example, give no protection against independent
creation and they exist without the need to fulfill any formal
requirements. The copyright requirement of originality has not been
very strict. Trade secrets law is not unique in that it allows reverse
engineering. The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984
sanctions reverse engineering and some degree of copying of
protected chip designs.46 There is a similar provision in the 1987 EU
Directive on the legal protection of topographies of semiconductor
43. See Giorgio Mondini et al., Italy, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:
EUROPEAN JURISDICTIONS, 342 (Dennis Campbell & Susan Cotter eds., 1995).
44. See Carlos M. Correa, Harmonization of Intellectual Property Rights in Latin
America: Is There Still Room for Differentiation?, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 109, 131-32
(1997).
45. See S. J. Soltysinski, Are Trade Secrets Property?, 17 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. 331, 332 (1986).
46. 17 U.S.C. § 906(a)(1)-(2) (2000). See also Richard H. Stem, Determining Liability
for Infringement of Mask Work Rights Under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 70 MINN.
L. REV. 271, 326-39 (1985); Leo J. Raskind, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984
and its Lessons: Reverse Engineering, Unfair Competition, and Fair Use, 70 MINN. L. REV.
385, 388-90 (1985).
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products.47 If earnest creative efforts are involved, the law is not
violated. In all these cases, competitors can obtain the benefit of the
information through licensing, or, if they choose, through reverse
48engineering or independent innovation.
Though there are major analogies in the ways trade secrets and
patents encourage private innovation and facilitate commercialization
of technology, the specific features of trade secrets merit closer
consideration. Patents encourage public disclosure, which in turn
prevents wasteful duplication of inventive efforts and allows building
on prior work. The publication is rewarded by exclusive rights in the
protected invention, which enables recouping the cost of its creation.
Patents are limited in time; so ultimately, the invention becomes a
part of the public domain. Trade secrets have to be kept secret to be
protected and can provide potentially infinite protection for
confidential information. A patent is granted only after ascertaining
that information meets the requisite criteria of novelty and
inventiveness; trade secrets exist without the assessment of the
innovative value of the information at stake. Thus, a legitimate
question is whether encouraging the use of trade secrets undermines
the patent system.49 Yet, rather than contradict the purpose of the
patent system, trade secrets supplement it. First, all patentable
inventions are trade secrets until the publication of the patent
application. Further, secret know-how concerning the implementation
of a patented invention is often licensed with patents, which indicates
that there is some level of symbiosis between patents and know-
how.5 ° Second, companies typically employ a combination of trade
secret and patent strategies to protect their innovations and maintain a
competitive edge. Trade secrets can be used to protect inventions that
are not patentable or those in which the length or other conditions of
patent protection are inadequate. The costs of preparing a patent
application are not insignificant and the process is lengthy. If the
expected commercial life of a patentable invention is short, it may not
47. See Articles 2(2), 5(3), and 5(4) of the Council Directive 87/54/EEC of 16 December
1986 on the Legal Protection of Topographies of Semiconductor Products, 1987 O.J. (L 24) 36.
48. For a more comprehensive comparison between trade secrets and other intellectual
property rights, see Risch, supra note 19, at I I-13.
49. For example, Professor Bone forcibly argues that trade secret law undermines the
effectiveness of the patent system. See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law:
Doctrine in Search ofJustification, 86 CAL. L. REv. 241, 269-70 (1998).
50. See, e.g., Rudolf Krasser, Protection of know-how in Germany, in THE PROTECTION
OF KNOW-HOW IN 13 COUNTRIES. REPORTS TO THE VIITH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF
COMPARATIVE LAW-PESCARA, 1970 28-29 (Herman Cohen Jehoram ed., 1972).
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be worthwhile to obtain a patent.5' Third, whereas it takes a while for
a patent system to adjust to the pace of innovation, the flexibility of
trade secrets makes it possible to use them as "gap fillers" in settings
where the formal rights system in IP is underdeveloped. For
example, in the 1960s and 1970s, before it was established that
computer programs qualify for protection as "literary works", IT
firms viewed trade secrecy as the best means of protecting their
software against unauthorized copying. 3 Trade secrets continue to
play an important role in protecting innovations in high-tech
industries.5 4 In addition, the fact that trade secret protection arises
automatically, as a matter of law, with no costly or lengthy
application process, makes it particularly suitable to protect
inventions of smaller companies.
III. TRADE SECRET LAWS 1N THE U.S. AND IN THE EU
Trade secret cases consistently involve complex policy issues.
They require careful balancing between conflicting interests of
companies wanting to protect the fruits of their research and
51. See, e.g., Friedman et al., supra note 19, at 63-64; WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 356-59 (2003);
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret
Protection. A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 371, 388-91
(2002). There are other business and legal factors which may support the choice of trade secret
protection. If an invention is unlikely to be reversely engineered or independently developed
within the lifespan of patent protection, companies may choose to rely on trade secret law. The
cost and difficulty of keeping the invention secret, as opposed to the costs of obtaining and
policing a patent, must also be taken into the account.
52. JAGER, supra note 9, § 1: 1.
53. See JAGER, supra note 9, § 1:2; Bradford L. Smith & Susan 0. Mann, Innovation and
Intellectual Property Protection in the Software Industry: An Emerging Role for Patents?, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 241, 243 (2004); Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information
Economy, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1633, 1638-49 (1998). The growing importance of trade secrets for
information technologies was also endorsed by the IPR Helpdesk sponsored by the European
Commission:
Today's business environment has increased the importance of trade secret
protection and the development and implementation of information protection
practices .... [T]rade secrets are rapidly becoming, in some cases, a choice form
of intellectual property protection in the information economy. Machinery and
mechanisms were the brainchildren of the Industrial Age and patent law was
designed to protect these. In the Information Age, trade secret protection is, in
some cases, the most attractive, effective and readily available intellectual
property right.
IPR Helpdesk, The Legal Protection of Trade Secrets, § A, http://www.ipr-
helpdesk.org/docs/docs.EN/LegalprotectionofrradeSecrets.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2007).
54. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 3, at 30-56 (2003) [hereinafter FTC REP.],
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
2008] ANTITRUST AND TRADE SECRETS: THE U.S. & EU 219
innovation, employees wanting to preserve their freedom to take new
jobs and use their skills, and society in general, which profits from
innovative products and vigorous competition in the marketplace.55
Unlike other areas of IP law which are based on statutory law, trade
secrets remain largely the creature of jurisprudence. What qualifies as
a trade secret is only decided in litigation through a comprehensive
evaluation of all the relevant factors.56 Trade secret cases on both
sides of the Atlantic are often fact-specific and general principles of
trade secret laws are not easy to ascertain. The following section is an
attempt to trace these basic principles and provide an overview of the
trade secrets laws in the EU and in the United States.
A. Harmonizing Trade Secret Laws in America
Common law of trade secrets developed throughout the
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. 57 In 1837, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided that a contract for
sale of a chocolate mill with an "exclusive right and art or secret
manner of making chocolate" was enforceable and did not create any
illegal restraint of trade. 58 In Peabody v. Norfolk, the same court held
that:
One who invents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process of
manufacture, whether proper for a patent or not, has a property
therein which a court of chancery will protect against one who in
violation of contract and breach of confidence undertakes to apply
it to his own use or disclose it to third persons.59
The basic principles of trade secret law were first codified in the
1939 Restatement of Torts. 60 The Restatement proved to be very
influential and its definition of a trade secret has been almost
universally cited by courts,61 including the U.S. Supreme Court.62 It
has remained popular with courts and commentators even after the
publication of the second edition of the Restatement of Torts, which
55. See POOLEY & GRAVES, supra note 28, § 1.02.
56. See James Pooley, The Top Ten Issues in Trade Secret Law, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 1181,
1182 (1997).
57. For a historical outlook, see JAGER, supra note 9, §§ 2:1-2:4.
58. Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 523 (1837).
59. Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868).
60. See, e.g., I JAGER, supra note 9, §§ 3:1-3:2.
61. See, e.g., I JAGER, supra note 9, § 3:4; 1 MILGRIM, supra note 12, § 1.01.
62. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1964). See also
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979) (referring to the Restatement of
Torts' definition as "[t]he most commonly accepted definition of trade secrets").
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no longer contains a section dealing with trade secrets.6 3 The
Restatement's definition also appears to be influential in Europe.
64
Comment b of section 757 of the Restatement defines trade secrets as:
Any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which
is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It
may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of
manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a
machine or other device, or a list of customers.
65
A trade secret must be capable of being continuously used in the
operation of the business. It is not "simply information as to single or
ephemeral events in the conduct of the business, as, for example, the
amount or other terms of a secret bid for a contract." 66 The invention
need not be novel or have any intrinsic value to qualify for protection
under trade secret law; it does not need to be patentable. When
discussing novelty and prior art, the Restatement concludes:
A trade secret may be a device or process which is patentable; but
it need not be that. It may be a device or process which is clearly
anticipated in the prior art or one which is merely a mechanical
improvement that a good mechanic can make. Novelty and
invention are not requisite for a trade secret as they are for
patentability.
67
The Restatement concedes that an exact definition of trade
secrets is difficult to discern from common law principles. 68 It then
lists factors that are relevant for determining whether given
information is a trade secret as follows:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his
business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and
others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by
63. See 1 MILGRIM, supra note 12, at § 1.01; 1 JAGER, supra note 9, § 3:2; POOLEY &
GRAVES, supra note 28, §2.02. Several states, including New York and Texas, continue to rely
on the principles of trade secrets law expressed in the Restatement (First) of Torts and did not
adopt the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA). See 2 JAGER, supra note 9, §§ 50:1 and 61: 1.
64. Notably, the EU IPR Helpdesk refers to the Restatement's six factors to identify the
type of information that qualifies for protection under trade secret law. See IPR Helpdesk, supra
note 53, Section B.
65. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
66. Id. Section 759 of the Restatement dealt with business information such as financial
data, bids, supplier information, and business plans; this type of information, unlike "real" trade
secrets, was protected only from improper procurement by a competitor who thereafter uses or
discloses it.
67. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
68. Id.
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him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the
information to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort
or money expended by him in developing the information; (6) the
ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly
acquired or duplicated by others.
6 9
Courts have not interpreted these conditions very strictly.7° For
example, trade secret protection was afforded to information which
could be easily duplicated by others competent in the given field. 71 In
one case, 72 the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama found that a recipe
for a mixed drink consisting of Jack Daniel's whiskey, Triple Sec,
sweet and sour mix, and 7-Up constituted a trade secret, even though
the plaintiff spent little time, effort, or money in concocting the drink
recipe 73 and the testimony of experts in the field of bartending
characterized the drink as a member of the Collins family of drinks,
of which there are many with essentially the same ingredients.74 The
court concluded that the plaintiffs ability to combine common
elements into a successful drink could be a trade secret entitled to
protection. In addition, the plaintiff put much effort into advertising
and marketing the beverage, which became the top seller in the
plaintiffs restaurant, comprising about a third of his total sales of
alcoholic drinks.75 The plaintiff took precautions to protect the
secrecy of recipe: he revealed it to only a few of his employees, the
bartenders, and specifically instructed them not to tell anyone about
the recipe.76 To prevent customers from learning the recipe, the
beverage was mixed in the 'back' of the restaurant and lounge.77 The
Court reasoned that the fact that the exclusive sale of the drink was of
great value to the plaintiff was sufficient to infer that the beverage
could also have been valuable to his competitors.78 The Restatement
definition and the factors cited above leave plenty of discretion to
courts. As the Fifth Circuit noted, "[t]he term 'trade secret' is one of
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. Playwood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 723 (7th
Cir. 2003).
71. See, e.g., KFC Corp. v. Marion-Kay Co., Inc., 620 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Ind. 1985);
Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549 (D. Conn. 1964); Mason v. Jack Daniel
Distillery, 518 So. 2d 130, 133 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987).
72. Mason, 518 So. 2d. at 130.
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the most elusive and difficult concepts in the law to define., 79 In
many cases, the existence of a trade secret is decided based on an ad
hoc evaluation of all the surrounding circumstances.8 °
In 1979, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) was adopted
with the view of clarifying and harmonizing the standards of trade
secret protection.81 So far, the UTSA has been adopted in forty-six
states.82 It defines a trade secret as:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program
device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy."
8 3
The definition is broader than the Restatement of Torts'
definition, e.g., it does not mention the condition that the information
must be capable of continuous use by the owner in business.84 The
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition adopted by the American
Law Institute in 1995 was another step to further high and consistent
standards for trade secret protection in the U.S. It defines trade secrets
as "any information that can be used in the operation of a business or
other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford
an actual or potential economic advantage over others."8 5 The six
factors used to establish the existence of a trade secret contained in
the Restatement (First) of Torts are still relevant, but not dispositive
for determining the existence of trade secrets.
86
The adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
coincided with the move towards federalization of trade secrets law.
79. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Ark-Ell Springs, Inc., 569 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir.1978).
80. Id. at 289. See also Learning Curve Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d at 723.
81. See POOLEY, supra note 28, § 2.03.
82. See 1 JAGER, supra note 9, § 3:29. The trade secret protection granted in each state
may still vary considerably, yet for the purpose of establishing general principles of trade secrets
protection in the U.S., the UTSA and the Restatements are sufficient.
83. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A 536 (1985).
84. Consequently, information that has commercial value from a negative viewpoint, for
example the results of lengthy and expensive research which proves that a certain process will
not work, could be of great value to a competitor. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, cmt. 5 ; I
MILGRIM, supra note 12, § 1.01(2)(a).
85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
86. See 1 JAGER, supra note 9, § 3:6.
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The Economic Espionage Act87 (EEA), adopted in 1996,88 established
a comprehensive and systematic scheme using criminal sanctions to
protect trade secrets at the federal level.8 9 Similar to the UTSA, the
EEA defines trade secrets as:
[AIll forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical,
economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans,
compilations, program devices, formulas, design, prototypes,
methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes,
whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored,
compiled, or memorized physically, electronically, graphically,
photographically or in writing if-
(A) The owner thereof has taken reasonable steps to keep
such information secret; and
(B) The information derives independent economic value,
actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and
not being readily ascertainable by proper means by the
public.
90
Although there are important differences between the UTSA, the
Restatement of Unfair Competition, and the EEA, they are all
designed to protect information that is 1) valuable information in that
it confers some sort of competitive advantage, which 2) derives its
value from not being publicly known, and 3) with respect to which
87. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified at
18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2000)).
88. For commentary and reasons for the adoption of the EEA, see, e.g., James H.A.
Pooley et al., Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
177 (1997); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Trade Secrets: How Well Should We Be Allowed to Hide
Them? The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1,
4-5 (1996); Chris Carr et al., The Economic Espionage Act: Bear Trap or Mousetrap?, 8 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 159 (2000); Gerald J. Mossinghoff et al., The Economic Espionage Act: A
New Federal Regime of Trade Secret Protection, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 191
(1997).
89. The EEA makes trade secrecy misappropriation a federal offense, punishable by fines
up to $5,000,000 and imprisonment up to 10 years. Trade secret theft is defined as knowingly
engaging in a trade secret conversion, with an intent to benefit someone other than the trade
secret owner and with an intent or knowledge that the information will injure an owner of the
trade secret. See 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2000). Foreign economic espionage, defined as knowing
misappropriation of trade secrets by foreign governments and agents or anyone acting on their
behalf, is subject to even more severe penalties: up to 15 years imprisonment and up to
$10,000,000 fine. The injured parties do not, however, have a federal cause of action for the loss
of a trade secret. See 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2000).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (2000). Arguably, the EEA extends the definition of trade secrets
contained in the UTSA; its references to information in any form, "whether tangible or
intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled or memorized... " suggest that memorizing a
trade secret may be a means of misappropriating it under the EEA.
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the holder took reasonable steps to keep it secret. Whereas intellectual
property rights (IPRs) are usually limited to a particular type of
information, 91 or a particular way information is used or expressed,92
trade secrets are broadly defined as "information." Technical or non-
technical and nonscientific business information,93 ideas and facts, or
a particular way they are expressed all can be protected as trade
secrets. There is no review of novelty or non-obviousness, as in the
case of patents, or originality, as under copyright law; it suffices that
the information gives a demonstrable competitive advantage.94 The
information must not be readily available and it must be specific
enough. General skill and knowledge cannot be protected under trade
secrets law;95 readily ascertainable ideas or trivial advances in known
formulas or processes are not protectable. 96 These concepts are open-
ended and, to some extent, vague. Thus, the determination of what
constitutes a trade secret is very fact-specific; it depends upon the
nature of the information and the circumstances surrounding its
secrecy and the maintenance thereof.97 In principle, the thresholds are
not high. For example, a mixture of commonly-known chemicals will
not qualify as a trade secret, yet a special proportion of well-known
ingredients might constitute a trade secret. 98 In another case, the
Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that
essentially the entirety of the plaintiffs business, its manufacturing
process, its source of supply, its economics (including raw material
costs and resale prices), and the identity of its customers, was a trade
secret. 99 The court concluded that the condition that information
91. Patents protect only inventions in the field of technology.
92. Copyright protection extends only to the particular form in which an idea is
expressed; ideas or facts as such are not copyrightable. Trademarks give an exclusive right to
use a particular sign for a specified type of good or service; protection does not extend, e.g., to
artistic works where trademark is employed.
93. See I JAGER, supra note 9, § 3:3.
94. See I MILGRIM, supra note 12, §§ 1.03 and 1.08. The information claimed to be a
trade secret must also be sufficiently identified. See, e.g., Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 963 F. Supp.
664, 672 (N.D. II1. 1997); Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 992 P.2d 175 (Idaho 1999).
95. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i), (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A 536 (1985); see
also I MILGRIM, supra note 12, § 5.02.
96. See I MILGRIM, supra note 12, § 1.03.
97. See, e.g,. Enter. Leasing Co. v. Ehmke, 3 P.3d 1064, 1068 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999)
(citing B.C. Ziegler and Co. v. Ehren, 414 N.W.2d 48, 53 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987)).
98. See I MILGRIM, supra note 12, § 1.09(l)(b).
99. See Elm City Cheese Co., Inc. v. Federico, 752 A.2d 1037, 1053-54 (Conn. 1999).
The plaintiff was a small, family run cheese producer and the defendant was a close friend as
well as the accountant for the plaintiff. The profitability of the plaintiffs business depended
upon the use of a particular ingredient, which ingredient could not be discerned in the final
product, and it was a supplier of an intermediate material to but three customers. The individual
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asserted as a trade secret derives independent economic value from
not being generally known was satisfied by the internal economics of
the plaintiffs business. The fact that the economics and process
information yielded a business result which was highly profitable
satisfied this standard. 00 The Court of Appeals of Arizona took a
different approach in Enterprise Leasing Co. of Phoenix v. Ehmke. 10 1
The court determined that confidential documents comprising detailed
financial data, strategic plans, and methods and approaches of a
particular business'0 2 met the requirement that information protected
as a trade secret affords a demonstrable competitive advantage. The
court reasoned that value of the information can be inferred if the
owner can show that the information confers upon it an economic
advantage over others in the industry.'0 3 The documents at stake in
this case provided economic value for the plaintiff because they
would allow a competitor to gain an advantage if the documents were
discovered in the marketplace.'
0 4
The single most important requirement is that the information at
stake is in fact secret.' 0 5 Matters that are general knowledge in an
industry or which were publicly disclosed cannot be protected as trade
secrets. 10 6 The value of the information stems from its secrecy; its use
by competitors is likely to lead to the unjust enrichment of the actor
or injury of the owner.'0 7 If the information passes this relatively low
threshold, it can be properly considered a trade secret. Secrecy does
not need to be absolute. It suffices that it would be difficult or costly
for others who could exploit the information to acquire it without
defendant, after serving as plaintiffs accountant for many years, began participating directly in
the business, first in an independent way and then ultimately as an employee.
100. Id. at 1053.
101. Enter. Leasing Co. of Phoenix v. Ehmke, 3 P.3d 1064 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
102. The documents included: (1) year-to-date fiscal activities by branch office; (2)
revenue per car for each branch office; (3) number of vehicles per branch office; (4) ancillary
sales activities; (5) analysis of each branch office's productivity; (6) operating plans for the
fiscal year; (7) expansion plans; (8) market-by-market break-even points; (9) gross revenue and
costs on an area basis; (10) number of rental vehicles per branch office; (11) rental revenue
derived from daily rates and ancillary sales; (12) profitability statements on a per unit basis; (13)
fleet size; (14) overall profitability; and (15) a 'Customer Service Worksheet.' id. at 1067 n.1.
The documents were quite dated.
103. Id. at 1070 (citing Rivendell Forest Prods. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 28 F.3d 1042,
1046 (10th Cir. 1994)).
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Ashland Mgmt. Inc. v. Janien, 624 N.E.2d 1007, 1013 (N.Y. 1993); Dionne
v. Se. Foam Converting & Packaging, Inc., 397 S.E.2d 110, 113 (Va. 1990); Sands v. Estate of
Buys, 160 S.W.3d 684, 687 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005).
106. See I MILGRIM, supra note 12, § 1.03; 1 JAGER, supra note 9, § 3:2.
107. POOLEY & GRAVES, supra note 28, § 2.03[2][b], [4][c].
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resort to wrongful conduct. Both under the UTSA and the
Restatement of Unfair Competition, the security precautions taken by
the owner of the information to maintain secrecy are of the essence.
The UTSA makes the efforts to maintain secrecy a necessary element
of a trade secret. The Restatement of Unfair Competition provides
that the efforts to maintain secrecy can be evidence of the value of the
information and of its actual secrecy. 108 The security precautions must
be reasonable under the circumstances. 109
Trade secret protection is limited; only misappropriation or
attempted misappropriation is actionable. The owner of a trade secret
does not have an exclusive right to possession or use of the secret
information. 110 Trade secret law does not afford protection against
independent development and reverse engineering."' It does not
create rights against good faith purchasers. 1 2 Misappropriation
involves unauthorized disclosure or use by third persons who are
under the obligation to maintain secrecy or limit use, or acquisition of
secret information by improper means."13 Only a person who acquires
information that she knows or should have known to be a trade secret
may be held liable. 1 4 It is not the act of discovering someone else's
108. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39, cmt. g (1995).
109. See I MILGRIM, supra note 12, § 1.04.
110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43, cmt. a (1995).
111. See I JAGER, supranote9,§§ 3:11-3:12.
112. Under the First Restatement of Torts, a person who innocently acquires a trade secret
and thereafter learns that the original acquisition was improper is not liable even for subsequent
use or disclosure, provided that she acquired the information in good faith and paid value for it
or otherwise substantially changed her position before receiving the notice. Lao, supra note 53,
at 1660. However, under the UTSA and under the Third Restatement of Unfair Competition, a
person who continues to use a trade secret after learning of the initial improper acquisition is
still liable, even if she paid value for the secret or otherwise changed her position before she
received the notice of improper acquisition. Id.
113. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § l(2)(ii), (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A 536 (1985);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 40 (1995).
114. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, cmt. f(1939); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 40 and 43 (1995). The UTSA defines misappropriation of trade
secrets as:
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason
to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied
consent by a person who
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret;
or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use knew or had reason to know that his
knowledge of the trade secret was
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trade secrets that is unlawful, but only doing so by improper means,
such as theft, fraud, misrepresentation, espionage, or other wrongful
means.' 15 Actionable misappropriation of a trade secret requires proof
of conduct that falls below an acceptable level of commercial
morality or a violation of some express or implied promise to hold a
particular matter in confidence." 6 In E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co.,
Inc. v. Christopher, gathering information by using means that are
otherwise lawful - in this case taking pictures from an airplane - was
held to be an encroachment on trade secrecy, because the
circumstances of the case made the means in which information was
obtained unfair and improper." 7 Third parties may be liable for trade
secrets misappropriation if they knowingly or negligently obtain
confidential information from someone who acquired it or disclosed it
unlawfully.11
8
The efforts to harmonize and strengthen protection for trade
secrets and the introduction of federal means to prosecute trade
secrets theft coincided with the efforts to promote high standards of
protection for trade secrets at the international level. Trade secrets
provisions largely analogous to those found in the UTSA were
included in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and
in TRIPS." 9 NAFTA contains a number of provisions intended to
bolster and harmonize the domestic IP laws of the U.S., Canada, and
(I) derived from or through a person who has utilized improper
means to acquire it;
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain
its secrecy or limit its use; or
(III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the
person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(C) before a material change of his [or her] position, knew or had reason
to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been
acquired by accident or mistake.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2), (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A 536 (1985).
115. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, cmt. f(1939); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995). The "wrongful means" are usually prohibited under criminal
or tort law; a more difficult question is whether "wrongful means" under trade secrets law could
include non-criminal and non-tortious "bad acts." This question was answered in the affirmative
in E. L duPont deNemours & Co., Inc. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), but this
opinion remains controversial.
116. See, e.g., POOLEY& GRAVES, supra note 28, § 2.03.
117. E.1.duPont.,431F.2dat 1017.
118. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. b (1995); UNIF.
TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2), (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A 536 (1985). See also 2 MILGRIM, supra
note 12, § 7.02; 1 JAGER, supra note 9, § 3:16.
119. See, e.g., Lao, supra note 53, at 1677.
228 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.I. [Vol. 24
Mexico, the three contracting countries. 120  The trade secrets
provisions are contained in Article 1711, which defines trade secrets
in accordance with the basic principles established under U.S. law.
Trade secrets are protected against disclosure, use, or acquisition by
third persons in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices.
121
Shortly after NAFTA was agreed upon, similar provisions on trade
secrets' protection were also included in the TRIPS Agreement.1
22
There is still much dissatisfaction with the law of trade secrets in
the U.S. It has been pointed out that it lacks the systematic approach
of federal patent and copyright regimes. Definitions of trade secrets
were criticized as insufficient to analyze and decide potential trade
secret issues in a consistent and predictable manner. 123 The level of
uniformity of trade secrets laws across jurisdictions has also been
described as unsatisfactory, and federalization has been called for.
12 4
Having said that, recent years have been marked by steady
development and strengthening of trade secrets law in the U.S. The
Restatements and the UTSA largely harmonized the common law of
trade secrets. The EEA created criminal sanctions for trade secrets
misappropriation at the federal level. The U.S. government has also
been effectively promoting trade secrets protection standards at the
international arena.
120. NAFTA's Chapter Seventeen (Intellectual Property) obliges the contracting states to
"provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of IPRs." North American Free
Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 1701, 2, available at www.worldtradelaw.net/nafta/chap-
17.pdf. It defines IP rights and establishes minimum standards for IP protection, both in express
provisions and by reference to a number of international IP treaties. id. at art. 1701-02. See
generally 2 MILGRIM, supra note 12, § 9.07.
121. 2 MILGRIM, supra note 12, §9.07[4][a].
122. See supra Part II(A).
123. The Restatement (First) of Torts concludes that: "[a]n exact definition of a trade
secret is not possible." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939). The major
commentators agree that the there is no good, reliable, and bright-line definition of the term
"trade secret." See, e.g., I MILGRIM, supra note 12, § 1.01; 1 JAGER, supra note 9, at § 2:1;
Pooley, supra note 56, at 1181-82. See also Chiappetta, supra note 23, at 80-85.
124. See, e.g., Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 427, 442-48 (1995); Lao, supra note 53, at 1649-74; Pooley, supra note 56,
at 1188.
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B. Trade Secrets in the EU In Search of the Common
Principles
1. Harmonization of IP Rights in the EU and Trade
Secrets
Differences between national IP laws may constitute barriers to
intra-state trade and distort competition. For example, a Member State
with extremely strict counterfeiting laws could take action against
counterfeiting products coming from a Member State whose laws
were less stringent. Thus, harmonization of IP laws throughout the
Community was seen as necessary to eliminate barriers to intra-
Community trade. Since the mid 1980s, the European Union has
taken many legislative initiatives that led to harmonization of
trademark law,1 25 industrial designs law, 126 and major parts of
copyrights. 127  Standards relating to the protection of
semiconductors,1 28  software, 29 databases,1 30  and biotechnological
inventions' 3 1 have been established at the EU level. Unitary IP rights,
EU Trade Mark 32 and EU Design 33 have been created. A proposal
for a regulation establishing a European Patent is currently under
consideration. 34  Harmonization largely contributed to the
development of IP laws in Europe, stimulating the debate that resulted
in adopting high and progressive IP protection standards. The
Database Directive, for example, introduced a 15 year sui generis
right to protect the contents of a database against improper
125. See First Council Directive 89/104/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1.
126. See Council Directive 98/71/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 289) 28.
127. See Council Directive 93/83/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 248) 15; Council Directive
2001/29/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10; Council Directive 2001/84/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32;
Council Directive 2006/116/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 372) 12; Council Directive 2006/115/EC, 2006
O.J. (L 376) 28.
128. See Council Directive 87/54/EEC, 1987 O.J. (L 24) 36.
129. See Council Directive 91/250/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42.
130. See Council Directive 96/9/EC, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20.
131. See Council Directive 98/44/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13.
132. See Council Regulation 40/94, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1.
133. See Council Regulation 6/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 3) 1.
134. For an overview of the harmonization measures, see, e.g., Thomas C. Vinje,
Harmonising Intellectual Property Laws in European Union: Past, Present and Future, 8 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 361 (1995); 1 DAVID. T. KEELING, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EU
LAW 24-28 (2003).
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extraction. 35 Prior to the adoption of the Directive, such a right
existed only in Denmark.
136
Though voices advocating harmonization of trade secret laws are
not uncommon, 137 the Community has so far shied away from
harmonizing trade secrets law. This is unfortunate. Trade secret cases
increasingly implicate many countries, partly because of the growth in
the international licensing and partly because proprietary information
is often ephemeral and has no set location. The divergent trade secrets
laws may create problems in the context of licensing agreements, if
some information qualifies for protection in one Member State, but
does not in another. This could impede transfer of technology. The
discrepancies in national trade secrets laws may also create barriers to
trade, for example, when a product which is lawful in one country
violates the trade secrets laws of another Member State.
2. An Overview of Selected National Trade Secrets
Regimes
Taken there are no EU standards for trade secrets protection,
what follows are some general observations about protection of trade
secrets in various European jurisdictions to set the field for the
discussion of trade secret protection in the EU.
Confidential information is known under many different names
in various EU jurisdictions: "know-how", "trade secret", "confidential
information", or "businesses secret" are among them. No clear
distinction can be made between these notions and they are often used
interchangeably. 138 For example, § 17 of the German Unfair
Competition Law (UWG) 139 uses the terms Geschiifisgeheimnisse
(trade secrets) and Betriebsgeheimnisse (industrial secrets) to describe
135. Council Directive 96/9/EC, art. 10, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20.
136. See Vinje, supra note 134, at 366.
137. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ENTERPRISE DIRECTORATE GENERAL, PATENTS AND
OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE: WHAT PUBLIC AUTHORITIES NEED TO KNOW (2005),
http://europa.eu.int/idabc/servlets/Docid=20675. There seems to be an agreement that trade
secrets should be afforded a high level of protection. For example, Turkey was obliged to adopt
legislation on protection of know-how information and trade secrets legislation in line with
Member States' legislation, as one of the conditions concerning EU accession. See Council
Decision No 1/95, art. 7, 1996 O.J. (L 35) 1 (EC).
138. See FRANCOIS DESSEMONTET, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF KNOW-HOW IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (H.W. Clarke trans., 2d ed. 1976); Aldo Frignani, Know-how and
Trade Secrets, (September 18, 1995),
http://www.jus.unitn.it/cardozo/Review/Business/Frignani-1997/ Parigi2.htm (paper presented
at IBA/SBL Conference in Paris, Committee X, International Franchising).
139. Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb [Act Against Unfair Competition], June 7,
1909, RGBI. at 499, last amended July 3, 2004, BGBI. I at 1414, § 17.
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secrets of technical nature rather than "know-how", but these terms
are effectively interchangeable. Nor is the distinction clear in France,
where the terms "savoir-faire" (know-how), "secrets de fabrique"
(manufacturing secrets) and "secrets de commerce" (commercial
secret) are used. 140 English courts have been referring to confidential
information, trade secrets, and know-how. 14 1 In Poland, the terms
tajemnica przedsiqbiorstwa (trade secret) and know-how are in use.
To complicate the situation even more, legal definitions of these
terms are scarce and there is little agreement in the doctrine as to their
precise meaning. 142
Trade secret protection has a long tradition in European civil law
jurisdictions. In France, criminal law has been traditionally used to
protect trade secrets. While the French criminal code has had
provisions dealing with the theft of trade secrets since 1844,143 no
section of the civil code relates directly to trade secrets. The Code of
Industrial Property144 does not regulate trade secret protection; it
refers solely to exclusive rights and trade secrets are not regarded as
such. 45 At present, the key provision for protection of trade secrets in
France is Article L. 152-7146 of the Labor Code, under which an
employee divulging a manufacturing secret (secret defabrique) of his
employer may be subject to criminal sanctions. This provision does
not define manufacturing secrets. It has a rather limited scope of
application: only trade secret theft by directors or employees may be
sanctioned. 147  Confidentiality obligations may also be created
contractually; French courts have inferred such obligations from the
140. 3 AARON N. WISE, TRADE SECRETS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, §3.01-3.02 (1981)
(discussing different terms used to denote trade secrets and know-how in France, their
definitions and use in case law).
141. See COLEMAN, supra note 34, at 8-9; 2 WISE, supra note 140, §2.01, §2.03, §2.05
(discussing the difference between these notions).
142. See, e.g., Alois Troller, The Legal Protection of know-how General Report, in THE
PROTECTION OF KNOW-HOW IN 13 COUNTRIES. REPORTS TO THE VIIITH INTERNATIONAL
CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW-PESCARA, 1970, supra note 50, at 149-50.
143. See FABRE, supra note 19, at 37-65 (commenting on Article 418 of the Criminal
Code, its interpretation and the development of French trade secrets law); WISE, supra note 140,
§3.07.
144. Law No. 92-597 of July 1, 1992, Journal Officiel de la Rpublique Frangaise [J.O.]
[Official Gazette of France], Feb. 8, 1994.
145. Article L621-1 of the Industrial Property Code (Code de la propr&d industrielle)
states that the penalties for misappropriation of trade secrets are provided in Article L152-7 of
the Labor Code.
146. The provision was inserted by Law No. 92-1336 of December 16, 1992, Journal
Officiel de la Rrpublique Franqaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], December 23, 1992,
available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/UnTexteDeJorfnumjo=JUSX9200040L.
147. See Gasnier et al., supra note 42, at 196.
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nature of the agreement between the parties. 148 In the absence of an
agreement to protect confidentiality, general principles of tort liability
may be invoked if a third party uses or divulges secrets
communicated in good faith and the disclosure or use of the
information would violate the standards of commercial fairness.
149
The key provisions of the German trade secrets law are
embodied in the law of unfair competition (UWG), which was first
passed in 1909.150 In 2004, a new UWG 151 was adopted, which
essentially took over the law of trade secrets from the 1909 Act.
Under Article 17(1) of the UWG, employees may be subject to
criminal liability if they divulge trade secrets for the purpose of
competition, personal gain, or with the intent to damage the owner's
business. Article 17(2) UWG prohibits using or communicating a
trade secret without authorization, if the trade secret has been
obtained from an employee subject to liability under 17(1), or in
violation of bonos mores, e.g., through larceny, trespass, extortion,
trade espionage, or by systematic sounding out of former employees
of a competitor. Article 18 criminalizes use or disclosure of
confidential designs, models, drawings, technical instructions, etc.,
without authorization and either for personal gain or for competitive
purposes. It applies to third persons who lawfully obtained trade
secrets in the course of their business, typically licensees. UWG does
not define the notion of a trade secret. Violation of the UWG
provisions gives rise to a claim for damages under Sec. 823(2) of the
German Civil Code (BGB). 152
Poland, following the German model, adopted a law against
unfair competition which contains provisions on trade secret
protection. The first Polish law of unfair competition was passed
shortly after Poland became an independent state, in 1926.153 The new
148. Id. at 198.
149. Id. at 196-97. For a comprehensive review of the civil law means to protect trade
secrets in France, see, e.g., FABRE, supra note 19, at 129-63; WISE, supra note 140, §3.08.
150. Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb [Act Against Unfair Competition ], June 7,
1909 RGBI. at 499 (amended July 3, 2004). The English version of the 1909 Act is available
from the WIPO website, at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docsnew/en/de/de023en.html.
151. Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb. [Act Against Unfair Competition], July 3,
2004 BGBI. I at 1414.. Since the provisions of the Act concerning trade secrets have not been
subject to significant changes in comparison with the 1909 Act, the literature on the subject pre-
dating the entry into force of the 2004 Act remains authoritative.
152. See Krasser, supra note 50, at 40-45.
153. Ustawa z dnia 2 sierpnia 1926 r. o zwalczaniu nieuczciwej konkurencji [Polish Act
Against Unfair Competiton of 2 August 1926], Official Journal 1930, No. 56, item. 467. Under
Article 10 trade secrets theft was subject to criminal liability.
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Act against Unfair Competition, 5 4 adopted in 1993, was seen as a
necessary part of the economic and political transition following the
fall of the communist regime. Article 11 of the Act provides that
passing, disclosing, or using a trade secret, or its acquisition from a
third person without authorization, is an act of unfair competition if it
endangers or affects the interest of the trade secret holder. Article
11(4) broadly defines a trade secret as undisclosed information of
technical, technological or organizational nature, or other type of
information having a commercial value, whose owner took steps to
keep it secret. Article 18 provides for civil remedies against acts of
unfair competition, including injunctive relief and monetary
compensation. Article 23 creates criminal sanctions for disclosure or
using a trade secret in commerce if it damages the business of the
trade secret's owner. Any person subject to the duty of confidentiality
and third persons who obtained information by illegal means may be
subject to criminal liability.
The first English cases involving trade secrets date from the
beginning of the 19 th century. 155 The breach of confidence action is
the major tool for trade secret protection. To prove breach of
confidence, a plaintiff must show the existence of confidential
information, its divulgence in circumstances importing an obligation
of confidence, and the subsequent use or disclosure of the information
to the plaintiffs detriment. 156 Since no formalities are required to
obtain protection, courts decide whether particular information is
protectable when a dispute arises. The threshold is not high. In
Saltman Engineering Co., Ltd. v. Campbell Engineering Co., Ltd.,157
Lord Greene M.R. said that "what makes [the information]
confidential is the fact that the maker of the document has used his
brain and thus produced a result which can only be produced by
somebody who goes through the same process." In Douglas v. Hello
Ltd., the Court of Appeal of England held that equity protects "the
opportunity to profit from confidential information about oneself in
the same circumstances that it protects the opportunity to profit from
154. Ustawa z dnia 16 kwietnia 1993 r. o zwalczaniu nieuczciwej konkurencji [Polish Act
Against Unfair Competition of 16 April 1993], Official Journal 1993 No 47 item. 211.
155. See Newbery v. James, (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1011 (Ch.); Yovatt v. Winyard, (1820)
37 Eng. Rep. 425 (Ch.). For an overview of the historical development of the early English
common law relating to trade secrets, see, e.g., I JAGER, supra note 9, §2:2; CORNISH &
LLEWELYN, supra note 34, at 304-05.
156. See Coco v. A.N. Clark (Eng'rs), Ltd., [1968] F.S.R. 415 (Ch.). See also CORNISH&
LLEWELYN, supra note 34, at 305-27.
157. Saltman Engineering Co., Ltd. v. Campbell Engineering Co., Ltd. [1963] 3 All E.R.
413,415.
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confidential information in the nature of a trade secret."' 15 8 The
remedies for a "breach of confidence" include injunctive relief,
damages, and third-party liability. However, unlike the continental
jurisdictions, English law has not created criminal sanctions for
breach of confidence or trade secret theft.
15 9
3. A Few Common Principles
Trade secrets laws vary significantly across the EU Member
States. For example, unlike other surveyed jurisdictions, Germany
and Poland require that a trade secret holder have a justifiable interest
to keep the information secret, which is assessed in relation to the
relevance of the subject of the secret for the competitiveness of the
enterprise. 60 Still, some basic principles as to what constitutes a trade
secret may be distilled from German, 16' French, 162 Polish, 163 and
English jurisprudence.164  Protection is afforded to confidential
information, which has commercial value, and whose owner takes
reasonable measures to keep it secret. The de facto secrecy of
information and the owner's continued efforts to maintain this secrecy
are the key ingredients of a trade secret. In the absence of secrecy, no
claim to the information can be made. If any interested party can learn
158. Douglas v. Hello Ltd. [2005] EWCA (Civ) 595, at 113 (C.A).
159. See Oxford v. Moss, (1978) Crim. App. 183 119. For an overview of the discussion
whether trade secrets theft should be a criminal offence, see, e.g., John Hull, Analysis: Stealing
Secrets: A Review of the Law Commission's Consultation Paper on the Misuse Of Trade
Secrets, 4 INTELL. PROP. Q. 422 (1998); Jon Lang, The Protection of Commercial Trade Secrets,
25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 462,463-65 (2003).
160. See KRASSER, supra note 50, at 33. With respect to Polish law, see Ustawa z dnia 16
kwietnia 1993 r. o zwalczaniu nieuczciwej konkurencji [Polish Act Against Unfair
Competition], Official Journal 1993 No 47 item 211, Art. 11(1) (referring to "the interests of the
entrepreneur" as the legal basis for the requirement).
161. The German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) ruled that "A trade secret or
business secret is any fact in relation to a business which is not apparent but is known to a
narrow circle only, and which according to the manifest intention of the owner of the business,
based on a sufficient economic interest, is to be kept secret. BGH GRUR 2003, 356, 358 -
Prazissionsmessgerite." Roger M. Milgrim, Commission Proposed Capital Punishment-by
Definition-for Trade Secrets, A Uniquely Valuable 1P Right, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'Y 919, 939 n.83 (2006).
162. In France it is required that trade secrets have a certain degree of originality and/or
commercial value and that they are kept secret from competitors, Court of Appeal in Paris, 13
June 1972; Supreme Court (Cour de cassation), 26 June 1973, Ann. 1974-85. Id. at 939 n.83.
163. For a legal definition of trade secrets in Poland, see Ustawa z dnia 16 kwietnia 1993 r.
o zwalczaniu nieuczciwej konkurencji [Polish Act Against Unfair Competion], Official Journal
1993 No47 item211,Art. 11(4).
164. In England, proprietary information is protected if it is used in a trade or business and
the owner must limit the dissemination of it or at least not encourage or permit widespread
publication. See Lansing Linde Ltd. v. Kerr [19911,1 W.L.R. 251..
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of the information without a great deal of sacrifice, the matter is
public and cannot be considered a trade secret.' 65 It is also usually
required that a trade secret holder has the intention to keep the
information secret and takes steps to protect secrecy. 66 Secrecy is the
source of competitive advantage, and it takes precedence over all
other conditions of protection. 167 Secrecy alone is not sufficient; there
must be a link between secrecy and economic advantage. The value of
trade secrets stems from the fact that they are useful for doing
business and not generally known; other companies would have to
expand considerable sums of money to obtain the protected
information. The fact that competitors are trying to obtain the
information at stake may constitute prima facie evidence of the
information's commercial value.'
68
There is also an agreement that a trade secret need not to be
patentable. 69 Although in some jurisdictions there seems to be a
requirement that a trade secret is "novel," it is not novelty in the
patent sense,' 70 taken that often a combination of known components
in a novel and attractive way suffices for obtaining protection.171
165. See IPR Helpdesk, supra note 53, Section C:
A substantial element of secrecy must exist. Information generally known to the
public or inside a particular industry is not typically afforded trade secret
protection. While secrecy need not to be absolute, it must be sufficient to confer
actual or potential economic advantage on one who possesses the information.
Thus the requirement of secrecy is satisfied if it would be difficult or costly for
others to acquire and exploit the information without resorting to some form of
wrongful conduct.
See also Krasser, supra note 50, at 33-34.
166. See IPR Helpdesk, supra note 53, Section B ("the de facto secrecy of information and
the owner's continued efforts to maintain this secrecy are the key ingredients of a trade secret").
167. See DESSEMONTET, supra note 31, at 249-52; Troller, supra note 142, at 152-53.
168. See DANIEL J. GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS 274-75 (2d ed. 2003).
169. See DESSEMONTET, supra note 31, at 3 (interpreting TRIPs); Troller, supra note 142,
at 152-53.
170. See CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 34, at 300-02 (discussing the relation of
confidence to patents in English Law); 2 WISE, supra note 140, §2.02 (commenting on English
Law).
171. See DESSEMONTET, supra note 31, at 248. Article 39(2)(a) of the TRIPS Agreement
makes it clear that the fact that most of the constituent parts of a trade secret are in the public
domain is not a reason to deny protection. Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) art. 39(2)(a), Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). A very similar
proviso is found in the definition of know-how contained in Article 1(7) of Commission
Regulation 556/89 of 30 November 1988 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to
Certain Categories of Know-How Licensing Agreements, 1989 O.J. (L61) 1.
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IV. ANTITRUST AND TRADE SECRETS
The policy underlying trade secrets is to encourage development
of new ideas by rewarding inventors and innovators with some
measure of exclusivity over their inventions. 172 Antitrust law is
designed to promote free competition and ensure unfettered flow of
ideas in the public domain. The problems created by the existence of
trade secrets are similar to those resulting from the existence of other
forms of IP. Yet, differences between other forms of IP and trade
secrets merit consideration. First, the scope of rights enjoyed by a
trade secret holder is usually such that it generally does not confer
significant market power or restrict competition.' 73 A trade secret
holder cannot restrain independent development or even reverse
engineering; he does not enjoy the exclusivity given to a patentee.
Thus, in principle, trade secrets contribute less to creation or
maintenance of market power than other forms of IP. In the U.S.,
unlike in the EU, these differences resulted in less vigorous
application of antitrust rules to trade secret transactions than to
transactions involving patents. 174 In the EU, antitrust enforcers do not
seem to have addressed these issues.
Licensing of trade secrets (or know-how), just as patent
licensing, is generally pro-competitive; it allows dissemination of
technology and its fuller exploitation. 75 Typically, a know-how
license allows the licensee to enter a new market. In the case of a
patent, the use of a licensed technology by third parties could be
enjoined by the courts. A know-how license may save time and
money involved in reverse engineering or independent R&D by
avoiding duplicative research. But the license can also be a mere
sham to cover price fixing or territory sharing between competitors.
In that case, consumers do not obtain the benefits of disseminating
technology and competition is unreasonably restrained.
With respect to monopolization, the main source of controversy
is interoperability standards that are kept secret, sometimes, in
addition to being protected by other forms of IP. A company enjoying
a dominant position in a relevant market can effectively limit
competition in a neighboring market by refusing to disclose the
interoperability standards. Interoperability standards often qualify for
172. See I JAGER, supra note 9, § 1:4.
173. See 3 MILGRIM, supra note 12, § 10.01(l)(a)(ii) and (c)(ii).
174. See 2 JAGER, supra note 9, § 11:2.
175. The Ninth Circuit pointed out the pro-competitive effects of know-how licensing in
A. & E. Plastik Pak Co., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710, 714-15 (9th Cir. 1968).
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protection under trade secret laws; they may also be covered by
patents, copyrights, or other forms of IPRs. Should a monopolist be
obliged to publish information on its innovations and new products
before they reach the market? Can a monopolist change the product or
product interfaces in a way that increases the costs of rivals operating
in neighboring markets? As it will be seen, the European and U.S.
antitrust enforcers addressed these issues quite differently.
A. U.S. Antitrust Law and Trade Secrets
Claims based on restraint of trade were made in the first U.S.
reported case involving trade secrets: the 1837 Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts decision in Vickery v. Welch. 176 The principal
question of law was whether an agreement whereby the seller of a
chocolate mill who conveyed a secret method of making chocolate on
the buyer and agreed not to use the secret method himself was in
restraint of trade. The court reasoned that the agreement was not an
illegal restraint of trade because it was "of no consequence to the
public whether the secret art be used by" the seller or the buyer of the
mill.177 Perhaps more convincingly, holding that confidentiality
clauses were not illegal restraints of trade, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reasoned that since the public has "no right to
compel publication", it "loses no right by respecting a restricted
disclosure. 178
American courts felt that there was no ground to interfere with
the parties' decision as to the duration of the agreement and an
obligation to pay royalties. An obligation to pay royalties even after
the licensed know-how ceases to be secret is valid and can potentially
last forever. 79 Thus, unlike patent or copyright licenses, which are
strictly limited to the duration of the term of protection, a trade secret
license is not subject to any time limitation. In Warner-Lambert,180
176. Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523 (1837). See also 1 JAGER, supra note 9, § 2:3.
177. Vickery, 36 Mass. at 527. This does not really address the real question, as if there
was no restraint, that the secret method of making chocolate could be used by both the seller and
the buyer of the mill.
178. John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 30 (6th Cir. 1907).
179. See Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 655
(S.D.N.Y. 1959); Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979). See also 2 JAGER,
supra note 9, § 11:7.
180. The case concerned a license agreement for the formula of Listerine (antiseptic
mouthwash) concluded in 1891. The licensee had paid the licensor over $22 million over 75
years; thereafter the licensee challenged the contract as invalid. The agreement was attacked on
the ground that it lacked any future consideration, because the secret formula was disclosed in a
1931 Journal of American Medical Society and in the course if an FTC action against the
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the court explicitly rejected the argument that the antitrust ban on
royalty payments that go beyond the life of a patent or copyright
should be extended to know-how licenses.' 8' In the case of licenses
covering both patents and trade secrets, the payment of license fees
for expired patents is banned, but the royalties for the use of know-
how can continue beyond the life of the licensed patent.'
8 2
The limited exclusionary effect of trade secrets was a significant
factor in the antitrust assessment of restrictions in trade secret
licenses. 183 To be sure, American courts did not ignore competitive
concerns resulting from trade secret exploitation. A trade secret
license that is merely a sham to restrain competition violates antitrust
laws. 184 Contractual and licensing rights of a trade secret owner are
subject to antitrust laws. Licensing restrictions are legal as long as
they have a valid business purpose, such as the granting of a right to
use a bona fide trade secret. In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park
& Sons Co., 85 the principal issue was whether the owner of a secret
medicine formula was entitled to control the prices of products made
by a secret process at a wholesale or retail level. Dr. Miles, a
manufacturer of trademarked medicines prepared in accordance with
secret formulas, entered into numerous distribution agreements with
wholesalers and retailers, which prohibited resale to unauthorized
dealers and set minimum resale prices. John D. Park & Sons, a
wholesale drug concern, which was not a party to Dr. Miles'
distribution network, obtained the medicines from authorized
distributors and sold it at cut prices. Dr. Miles brought suit against the
wholesaler for wrongful interference with a contract. The defendant
licensee. The court upheld the validity of the contract reasoning that if the parties wished to
terminate the royalty payments upon the disclosure of the secret formula they could have
provided so in the agreement. The court distinguished the case before it from those concerning
patents or copyrights licenses, on the ground that the latter involve exclusive rights that are
limited in time and granted in exchange for publication of the information at stake.
181. Warner-Lambert, 178 F. Supp. at 665-67.
182. See, e.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964) (regardless of state contract
law, a licensing agreement that extends a patent's monopoly beyond the life of the patent
involved is a per se violation of federal patent law); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d
1365 (11th Cir. 1983). See also 2 JAGER, supra note 9, § 11:7; 3 MILGRIM, supra note 12, §
10.01 (2)(a)(iii)[B].
183. See generally 2 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST
LAW § 28.1 (2007); 3 MILGRIM, supra note 12, § 10.01(1)(a)(ii).
184. See, e.g., A. & E. Plastik Pak Co., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710, 715 (9th Cir.
1968); CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 851 (lst Cir. 1985); Boeing Co. v. Sierracin
Corp., 738 F.3d 665, 677 (Wash. 1987).
185. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). For an in-
depth discussion of the case, see 8 PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION § 1620 (2d ed. 2002).
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counterclaimed that the price and customer resale restrictions violated
the Sherman Act. In response, Dr. Miles argued that the restrictions
were legal since they related to "proprietary medicines manufactured
under a secret process."'1 86 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the
argument that trade restraints were valid because they related to
medicines manufactured under a secret process. The restraints at stake
in this case concerned the sales of the manufactured product and not
the secret manufacturing process. 187 They were not designed to
protect good will or Dr. Miles' right to exploit the secret
manufacturing process. 188 A restraint of trade which would be
unlawful if applied to other manufactured articles cannot be justified
because the article in question is a proprietary medicine made under a
secret formula. 189 Since Dr. Miles, the Court has consistently
condemned resale price maintenance as per se unlawful. 190 The Court
upheld, however, other restrictions in Dr. Miles' agreements, in
particular those concerning confidentiality obligations and territorial
restraints.'91
In principle, antitrust analysis of other types of restraints in trade
secret licenses does not differ from those found in patent licenses.
Both the 1988 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International
Operations' 92 and the 1995 IP Licensing Guidelines 193 provide that all
forms of IP, including patents, copyrights, and trade secrets, are
essentially comparable to other forms of tangible or intangible
property. The IP Licensing Guidelines add that the governing antitrust
principles are the same regardless of the type of IP regime at stake.'
94
Also, prior to the adoption of the IP Licensing Guidelines, the
agencies treated restrictions in trade secret licenses just as those in
186. Dr. Miles Medical, 220 U.S. at 400.
187. Id. at 402.
188. Id. at 407.
189. Id. at 403-04.
190. See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 185, § 1620d; 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET
AL., IP AND ANTITRUST § 24.2 (2002).
191. Dr. Miles Medical, 220 U.S. at 402.
192. U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International
Operations § 3.6 (November 10, 1988).
193. U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for
the Licensing of Intellectual Property § 2.1 (April 6, 1995) [hereinafter IP Licensing
Guidelines], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf.
194. The Agencies note that there are "clear and important differences in the purpose,
extent, and duration of protection provided under the intellectual property regimes of patent,
copyright, and trade secret", and that these differences "are taken into account in evaluating
specific market circumstances in which transactions occur." Id.
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patent licenses. 19 5 The equal treatment of patent licenses and know-
how licenses makes sense because the economics of such licenses are
essentially the same. A trade secret license, just like a patent license,
is a transfer of valuable technology allowing for its efficient
exploitation. 196 In addition, the licensed technology is often a bundle
of patents and secret know-how. In such situations, application of
different antitrust standards to patents and trade secrets could impede
the transfer of technology.
Back in the 1970s, U.S. antitrust enforcers considered a number
of licensing practices to be per se illegal without regard to economic
effect. The list of prohibited licensing practices, known as the Nine
No-No S,197 was later abandoned for a more economics-based and
flexible approach. Today, U.S. antitrust enforcers perceive IP
licensing as generally welfare-enhancing and pro-competitive.
98
Application of the per se rule in the context of licensing restraints is
limited. The antitrust analysis of licensing restraints focuses on
whether an IP licensing agreement inhibited competition that would
have been present but for the license. Non-price restraints are rarely
challenged as anticompetitive, 199 and there has also been some
195. See 3 MILGRIM, supra note 12, §10.01(1)(c)(ii). The Department of Justice took the
view that restrictions in trade secret licenses cannot be greater than those permitted in the patent
context. This premise was based on the presumption that since trade secrets were not
congressionally conferred, in no event could a trade secret holder enjoy greater licensing
privileges than a patentee. Id.
196. Though unlike in the case of patents the value of the technology at stake is not
confirmed by the Patent Office, the commercial value of a trade secret can be inferred from the
fact that the licensee is willing to pay for the access to the licensed trade secrets.
197. See Bruce B. Wilson, Remarks before the Michigan State Bar Antitrust Law Section
and the Patent Trademark and Copyright Law Section in Detroit (Sept. 21, 1972), in CCH
TRADE REGULATION REPORTER: TRANSFER BINDER CURRENT COMMENT 1969-1983 50,146
(Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 12th ed. 1983) (1972). The list of prohibited practices
included: royalties not reasonably related to sales of the patented product; restraints on
licensee's commerce outside the scope of the patent (tie-outs); tying of unpatented supplies;
mandatory package licensing; exclusive grant-backs; licensee's veto power over grants of
further licenses; restraints on sale of unpatented products made with a patented process; resale
price maintenance and post-sale restraints on resale. For economic assessment of the "Nine No-
No's" and history of IP and antitrust intersection, see, e.g., Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro,
Antitrust Issues in the Licensing of Intellectual Property. The Nine No-No's Meet the Nineties,
1997 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY. MICROECONOMICS 283 (1997); ABA SECTION
OF ANTITRUST LAW, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ORIGINS AND APPLICATIONS (2d ed. 2002).
198. See IP Licensing Guidelines, supra note 193, § 3.1. See also Mary L. Azcuenaga,
Remarks before the American Law Institute-American Bar Association (Jan. 26, 1995),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/azcuenaga/ali-aba.htm; Makan Delrahim, Remarks
before the George Mason Law Review Symposium (Oct. 6, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/205712.htm#N 13_.
199. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 190, § 24.3a.
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relaxation of price restraints. 200 Just like a patent owner, a trade secret
holder is entitled to license his invention in all fields of use or in
limited areas. 20 Territorial restrictions in trade secrets licenses are
also considered valid,20 2 as long as they do not amount to naked
market division among competitors. 20 3 Grant-backs are assessed under
the rule of reason;204 non-exclusive grant-backs are deemed pro-
competitive. 20 5 Tying arrangements, package licensing, and exclusive
dealing give rise to antitrust liability in limited circumstances.20 6
Horizontal restraints are subject to greater antitrust scrutiny, as there
is a fear that they may lead to cartel-like arrangements. 207 In
particular, patent pools and cross-licenses may give rise to serious
competitive concerns, e.g., when two or more patentees-
manufacturers use such arrangements to limit their output or fix
208prices.
All in all, trade secrets were essentially treated as other forms of
IP rights for the purpose of applying § 1 of the Sherman Act. If
200. For example, the DOJ and the FTC recently filed a joint amicus brief in Leegin
Creative Leather Prods. Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007), arguing essentially that Dr.
Miles should be overruled as irreconcilable with modem antitrust policy. Brief for the United
States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Leegin Creative Leather Prods. Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480).
201. See, e.g., A. & E. Plastik Pak Co., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710, 714-15 (9th
Cir. 1968); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964).
202. The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed the legality of territorial restrictions in Dr. Miles.
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Parks & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). See also Shin Nippon
Koki Co. v. Irvin Indus., Inc., 1975 WL 15505, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 23, 1975) (territorial
restrictions are valid as long as they are reasonably related to licenses of know-how); IP
Licensing Guidelines, supra note 193, §§ 2.3 and 5.1.
203. See2 HOVENKAMPETAL.,supranote 190, § 33.3.
204. See Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 645-46
(1947).
205. See Shin Nippon Koki Co., 1975 WL 15505 at *3; Santa Fe-Pomeroy, Inc. v. P & Z
Co., Inc., 569 F.2d 1084, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 1978). See also I HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note
190, § 25.2 (2002); 2 HOLMES, supra note 183, §29.3.
206. See IP Licensing Guidelines, supra note 193, §§ 5.3-5.4. Tying may be per se illegal
if the party imposing the tie has market power in the market for the tying product to appreciably
restrict competition in the market for the tied product and more than an insubstantial amount of
trade of the tied product is affected by the tie. See also 2 HOLMES, supra note 183, §§ 28.2-29.2;
1 HOVENKAMP ET. AL., supra note 190, §§ 24.3b2-24.4.
207. In applying the rule of reason to horizontal license arrangements, the Agencies
consider whether the restraints increase the risk of price co-ordination, output restriction, or the
creation of market power. See IP Licensing Guidelines, supra note 193, § § 3.3 and 5.1; see also
2 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 190 §§ 30.1-30.5.
208. See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. U.S., 323 U.S. 386 (1945); Am. Equip. Co. v.
Tuthill Bldg. Material Co., 69 F.2d 406 (7th Cir. 1934). See also 2 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra
note 190, §§ 32.1-32.3 and 34.3(discussing anticompetitive and pro-competitive effects of patent
pools and cross-licensing).
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anything, there are grounds to assert that trade secrets have been
treated more benign than other forms of IP. Unlike patents or
copyrights,20 9 trade secrets have never been presumed to create
market power.2'0 This has had a significant impact on the assessment
of tying arrangements in trade secret licenses.2 11 Territorial restraints
with respect to trade secret rights were ruled legal in Dr. Miles. In the
1970s, the Department of Justice recognized that a trade secret
licensor may be able to restrict sales of an unpatented product for
reasonable periods, even if the same restrictions were considered
illegal in patent licenses.12 As it has been mentioned above,
contractual clauses extending the duration of royalties payments after
the information protected as a trade secret became publicly available
were upheld by courts, whereas clauses extending royalty payments
beyond life of a patent in license agreements were held to be an
illegal extension of patent monopoly and a violation of antitrust laws.
The right of the owner to assert and defend her trade secret in
court has been recognized in the CVD case. 213 Enforcement of trade
secrets, however, may amount to monopolization if trade secrets are
asserted in bad faith, with the knowledge that a trade secret does not
exist or that the rights have not been violated.2 14 Other elements of
monopolization, such as market power in the relevant market, must
also be established to succeed on the monopolization claim.21 5 The
non-disclosure of trade secrets accompanying patent claims was held
209. See, e.g., U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (presumption that
copyrights confer market power); U.S. v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962) ("The requisite
economic power is presumed when the tying product is patented or copyrighted"); Int'l Salt Co.,
Inc. v. U.S., 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (presumption that patents confer market power); U.S. v.
Times-Picayune Pub. Co., 345 U.S. 594, 608 (1953) (patents confer monopolistic, albeit lawful,
market control). In Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984), the U.S.
Supreme Court confirmed the presumption in dicta, whereas the concurring Justices concluded
that there should be no such presumption. Id. at 38 n.7. Finally, in Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep.
Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45-46 (2006), the Court unanimously ruled that the fact that a tying
product is patented does not support the presumption of market power in a patented product.
210. See In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1113-14 (N.D. Cal.
1980) ("[I]t has never been held that trade secrets protection is sufficient to create a presumption
of economic power"); 3 P.M., Inc. v. Basic Four Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1350, 1359 (E.D. Mich.
1984) (same); see also 2 JAGER, supra note 9, § 11: 10.
211. There have been only a few cases where the question of the legality of using a trade
secret as the tying product was raised. See 2 JAGER, supra note 9, § 11:10.
212. See 3 MILGRIM, supra note 12, § 10.01(1)(c)(ii).
213. CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 850 (1st Cir. 1985).
214. See id. at 851. See also Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 766 F. Supp.
670, 689 (C.D. I11. 1991) [hereinafter Colt II].
215. See CVD, 769 F.2d at 851; Colt II, 766 F. Supp. at 688.
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not to constitute monopolization in Christianson v. Colt.216 In this
case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the
district court holding that Colt's insufficient disclosure of information
concerning a finished rifle in the patent applications for the rifle's
parts allowed it to retain monopoly over the rifle that extended
beyond the life of the patents. The Seventh Circuit pointed out that
while information at stake might have been valuable for Colt's rivals,
patent law did not oblige Colt to disclose it, as it was not within the
scope of the invention claimed in the patent application. Thus, the
summary judgment on antitrust claims could not stand.217 On remand,
Christianson argued that Colt's trade secrets were impossible to
reverse engineer, thus allowing Colt to perpetuate a commercial
monopoly previously protected by a patent. The district court rejected
this claim, holding that neither the federal patent regime nor antitrust
law mandate striking down trade secrets simply because they are
218difficult to reverse engineer.
The use of a trade secret to obtain a competitive advantage, even
by a company enjoying monopoly power, does not violate antitrust
laws. In a series of cases decided in the late 1970s, American courts
rejected the argument that a monopolist should be forced to pre-
disclose its new products to facilitate competition in an ancillary
market. The problem first arose in the context of changes in IBM's
policies in response to increasing competition from "plug-
compatible" manufacturers. 219 IBM began bundling peripheral
equipment control functions into mainframe hardware and changed
from a full disclosure policy to keeping operating system software
source code secret, as well as limiting and delaying interface
disclosures. This strategy was challenged both by antitrust authorities
and by IBM's competitors in private litigation.220 The claim that
antitrust laws mandated IBM to disclose its technological changes to
216. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 870 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1989)
[hereinafter Colt I].
217. Colt 1, 870 F.2d at 1303. For a discussion of the case, see, e.g., 2 HOLMES, supra note
183, § 11.4; 2 JAGER, supra note 9, §§ 10:2 and 11:11.
218. Colt 11, 766 F.Supp at 690.
219. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, IBM was a dominant manufacturer of computers in
the United States, but its market shares plummeted due to increased competition from peripheral
equipment (tape storage drives, disc drives, and add-on memory units that plugged into the
standard interfaces used on IBM System 360 and then System 370 mainframes) manufacturers.
IBM also faced competition from mainframe producers whose computers could be used
interchangeably with IBM computers and were cheaper.
220. For an overview of the IBM cases, see 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 185, §
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its rivals in advance of general release, so that they can make their
products compatible with IBM was firmly rejected; IBM was under
no duty to help its rivals survive or expand. IBM's behavior did not
completely foreclose rivals since they successfully reverse-engineered
IBM's products. Notably, the courts reasoned that depriving IBM of
its lead time would remove its incentive to invent.22' The same
considerations were important in cases involving compulsory
licensing of IP rights.2 22
In Berkey Photo,223 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit further elaborated on antitrust assessment of a refusal to pre-
disclosure of secret information about new products and strategic
product integration. The case focused on Kodak's simultaneous
launch of a "Pocket Instamatic" camera and a film in a new format,
developed specifically to match the camera. Kodak's strategy
precluded competitors in the film or camera markets from offering
substitute films and cameras, giving Kodak a valuable lead-time
advantage. Berkey, one of Kodak's competitors, alleged that Kodak's
failure to disclose information on its new offerings amounted to an
illegal monopolization or attempted monopolization of amateur
camera and film markets. Since Kodak was in a position to set
industry standards, rivals could not compete effectively without
offering products similar to Kodak's. 224 The refusal to pre-disclose
information on Kodak's new product allowed it to foster its monopoly
power and reap profits from its innovations. 225 This strategy gave
Kodak illegitimate advantage in the camera market and foreclosed its
rivals from a substantial part of the market, until they were able to
produce cameras compatible with the new film format.226 The court
agreed that Kodak's control of the film and camera market reached
the level of a monopoly.22 7 It also held that leveraging monopoly
power to gain advantage in a neighboring market is illegal, regardless
221. See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 436-
37 (N.D. Cal. 1978); see also Cal. Computer Prods., Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d
727, 744 (9th Cir. 1979); Memorex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machs., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir 1980);
Telex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 931-32 (10th Cir. 1975).
222. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983, 1012 -1013 (D. Conn. 1978);
SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs.
Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1138-39 (D. Kan. 1997); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys.
Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1186-87 (1st Cir. 1994).
223. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
224. Id. at 279.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 279-80 and 282.
227. Id. at 273.
2008] ANTITRUST AND TRADE SECRETS: THE U.S. & EU 245
of whether a monopolist is close to gaining control of the neighboring
market. 228 Yet, the claim that the lack of pre-disclosure of secret
information on new products violated §2 of the Sherman Act failed to
convince the court. The court asserted that a duty to pre-disclose
information on new products cannot be imposed simply because a
monopolist is present also in an ancillary market.229 Preservation of
the incentives to innovate was central for the Court's reasoning:
It is the possibility of success in the marketplace, attributable to
superior performance, that provides the incentives on which the
proper functioning of our competitive economy rests. If a firm that
has engaged in the risks and expenses of research and development
were required in all circumstances to share with its rivals the




Withholding from others advance knowledge of one's new
products, therefore, ordinarily constitutes valid competitive
conduct. Because, as we have already indicated, a monopolist is
permitted, and indeed encouraged, by § 2 to compete aggressively
on the merits, any success that it may achieve through "the process
of invention and innovation" is clearly tolerated by the antitrust
laws.
23 1
Since both the camera and the new film format were substantial
innovations, the changing of the format was legitimate 232 and Kodak's
monopoly power and its ability to set de facto industry standards did
not create a duty to pre-disclose its new products to competitors.233
The key restraint of competition in the IBM and Berkey Photo
cases was the use of a trade secret to gain advantage in another
market.234 Similar controversies arose in relation to proprietary spare
parts designs and the resulting advantage that original equipment
producers secured in the aftermarkets. The courts were generally not
228. Id. at 276. This conclusion is no longer valid taken the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling
in Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993) ("§ 2 [of the Sherman Act] makes
the conduct of a single firm unlawful only when it actually monopolizes or dangerously
threatens to do so").
229. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 276.
230. Id. at281.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 282-83.
233. Id. at 281. For a comment on cases involving disclosure of innovations, see 1
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 190, § 12.4.
234. See Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 275-76.
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receptive of independent service providers' claims that a refusal to
sell patented parts and to license copyrighted software violated
antitrust laws. Two circuit courts adopted a strong, but rebuttable
presumption that a refusal to license is legal. In Data General, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that "while
exclusionary conduct can include a monopolist's unilateral refusal to
license a copyright, an author's desire to exclude others from use of
its copyrighted work is a presumptively valid business justification
for any immediate harm to consumers. ' 35 The court did not exclude
the possibility of imposing antitrust liability for a refusal to license in
"rare cases in which imposing antitrust liability is unlikely to frustrate
the objectives of the Copyright Act," but it did not give any examples
of such situations.23 6 In Kodak, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit extended the possible means of rebutting the
presumption to include evidence that the defense and exploitation of
the copyright grant was merely a pretextual business justification to
mask anticompetitive conduct. 237 Most recently, the Federal Circuit
held that a unilateral refusal to license a valid IP right is legal,
238
regardless of the patent holder's subjective motivation. The court
further asserted that a patent owner who brings suit to enforce the
statutory right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the
claimed invention is exempt from the antitrust laws, even though such
a suit may have an anticompetitive effect.239 The court recognized two
limited exceptions to this rule. Antitrust immunity does not extend to
patent enforcement if 1) the asserted patent was obtained through
knowing and willful fraud or 2) the infringement suit was a mere
sham to cover what is actually no more than an attempt to interfere
directly with the business relationships of a competitor.240 Although
there is some tension between these three approaches, in all cases
mentioned here the courts were extremely wary of holding that a
235. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994).
236. Id. note 64.
237. Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1219 (9th Cir. 1997)
[hereinafter Kodak]. Both courts agreed that the presumption could be rebutted by evidence that
"the monopolist acquired the protection of the intellectual property laws in an unlawful
manner." Id. (citing Data Gen., 36 F.3d at 1188).
238. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis
V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004), suggests that, in general, there is a very limited scope for
antitrust intervention in refusal to deal cases. See also I HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 190, §
13.3.
239. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs., 203 F.3d at 1326.
240. Id.
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refusal to license a valid IP right violates the antitrust laws. Like the
holders of other IPRs, possessors of trade secrets are entitled to assert
their rights against would-be infringers and to defend their rights in
court. Just as in the case of patents, the assertion of a trade secret
claim in bad faith, in an attempt to monopolize, can be a violation of
the antitrust laws. 2 4 1 Notably, in Colt II, the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois specifically rejected the claim
that a trade secret owner should have the burden to prove that its trade
242
secrets were valid in order to benefit from antitrust immunity.
Finally, in Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.,243 trade secrets were
attacked on the essential facility theory.244 Intel cut off the supply of
microprocessors and proprietary information to Intergraph, one of its
customers, as a retaliatory measure for the latter's attempt to enforce
its IPRs against Intel. Intergraph claimed, among other things, that
Intel's chips and technical knowledge were so vital for its interests
that they constituted an essential facility and that they should be
licensed on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms. The lower court
agreed and granted a preliminary injunction that obliged Intel to
supply Intergraph with the relevant product information. 245 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the decision. In the
court's view, the condition for the application of the essential
facilities doctrine was a competitive relationship between the
company controlling the facility and the company requesting the
access. 24 6 Since Intel did not compete with Intergraph in the
downstream market for workstations, the essential facilities doctrine
did not apply. Even though it was established that Intel's withholding
of proprietary information lacked business justification, it was not
241. See CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d at 851 ("[T]he proper balance between the
antitrust laws and trade secrets law is achieved by requiring an antitrust plaintiff to prove, in
addition to the other elements of an antitrust violation, by clear and convincing evidence, that
the defendant asserted trade secrets with the knowledge that no trade secrets existed"). See also
Forro Precision, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 673 F.2d 1045, 1060 (9th Cir. 1982); Hydro-
Tech Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp., 673 F.2d 1171, 1177 (10th Cir. 1982).
242. Colt 11, 766 F. Supp. 670, 688-89 (C.D. Il. 1991).
243. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999) [herinafter Intergraph
if].
244. Intel's copyrights and other IP rights were also at stake.
245. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998), vacated, 195
F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
246. Intergraph IT, 195 F.3d at 1357. The court's reasoning suggested, however, that the
essential facilities doctrine could be applied to IPRs.
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established that Intel's behavior contributed to creating, maintaining,
or enlarging Intel's dominance.247
Although the refusals to license cases discussed above all
involved a bundle of rights, including copyrights or patents, there are
good reasons to assert that trade secrets should be treated in the same
manner as other forms of IP for the purpose of applying §2 of the
Sherman Act. The fact that a trade secret owner takes advantage of
lead time after a new product is introduced on the market is not a
ground for a valid antitrust claim. Difficulty in reverse engineering
does not support the finding of an illegal restraint of trade. First,
forced disclosure of trade secrets undermines the private incentives to
innovate in the same way as compulsory licensing does. Second, the
continued existence of a trade secret does not necessarily preclude the
prospective licensee from competing with goods, services, or
processes of the trade secret owner.248 There is an additional argument
for caution when it comes to compulsory licensing of trade secrets:
the continuing existence of the trade secrets depends in part on how
licensees behave and, in particular, whether they take appropriate
measures to guard trade secrets. 249 This means that the trade secret
holder should be free to choose licensees with whom she can entrust
her trade secrets.
247. Id. at 1358-59. Interestingly, the government also challenged Intel's conduct, but on
different grounds and with more success. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) alleged a
pattern of conduct whereby Intel denied technical information to its customers who asserted
their innovations in microprocessor technology, which helped Intel to maintain its monopoly by
discouraging leapfrogging innovations. The case ended with a consent decree in which Intel
agreed not to cease dealing with companies merely because they sued to enforce their IPRs. See
FTC Complaint, In re Intel Corp., No. 9288 11 (filed June 8, 1998),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/O6/intelcmp.pdf; FTC, Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid
Public Comment, http://www.flc.gov/os/1999/03/dO9288intelanalysis.htm. For a comment on
the Intel case, see, e.g., I HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 190, § 13.4d; 1 HOLMES, supra note
183, § 11.4; Maureen A. O'Rourke, Striking a Delicate Balance: Intellectual Property,
Antitrust, Contract, and Standardization in the Computer Industry, 12 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1,
12-18 (1998).
248. See 3 MILGRIM, supra note 12, § 10.01(2)0).
249. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 190, § 13.2d, note 28. The authors note that in
Telecomm Technical. Services. Inc. v. Siemens Rolm Communications, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d
1365, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2000), the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held that the
per se legality rule established by the Federal Circuit in In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig.
does not extend to trade secrets, reasoning that with a "broad definition of trade secret, virtually
every anticompetitive refusal to deal would be beyond reach of antitrust law." Telecomm Tech.
Servs., 150 F. Supp. 2d at 1370. There does not seem to be any broader authority to support this
line of reasoning; indeed, the Intel case referred to above largely concerned trade secrets.
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B. EU." Regulating Trade Secrets through Antitrust Law?
The history of European competition law touching IP rights has
been turbulent. 250 At first, national IP rules were considered a
nuisance when they were used to limit competition across frontiers
between resellers of identical products. The EU antitrust enforcers
viewed IPRs as ex post barriers to entry, rather than ex ante incentives
to invest in R&D. 251 There was little doubt that the competition rules
may override IPRs; the EU antirust enforcers constrained national IP
law by deciding that it had valid parts, referred to as "specific subject
matter", and non-valid parts.252 This policy solved the market
integration problem, while doing some violence to national property
rights.
From the mid-1980s, with the judgments in Caft Hag I253 and
Ideal Standard,254 IP rights gained recognition in EU law and new EU
legislation governing IP innovations emerged. On the competition law
side, block exemption regulations for patent licenses were adopted in
1984255 as well as pure know-how and mixed patent-and-know-how
licenses in 1988.256 The recognition of the need to protect IP resulted
in the adoption of standards for IP protection at the EU level and the
establishment of unitary trademark and design rights at the EU level.
At the same time, the new source of tension between IPRs and
antitrust law emerged: the alleged conflict between IP law and the
rules concerning abuse of dominance. Although, as it will be seen,
similar traits can be found in the developments at the intersection of
trade secret and antitrust law, trade secrets were treated particularly
harshly by EU antitrust enforcers, who, in the absence of harmonized
250. For an overview of the historical attitude of the Commission and EU courts towards
licensing, see VALENTINE KORAH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EC COMPETITION
RULES 25-43 (2006).
251. See KORAH, supra note 250, at 27.
252. Examples of this policy include the judgments of the ECJ in Joined cases 56/64 &
58/64, Etablissements Consten S.A.R.L. v. Commission, 1966 E.C.R. 299 and in Case 40/70,
Sirena S.r.l. v Eda S.r.l., 1971 E.C.R. 69. For an overview, see KORAH, supra note 250, at 1-20;
1 KEELING, supra note 134, at 22-29.
253. Case C-10/89, SA CNL-Sucal NV v. HAG GF AG, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3711.
254. Case C-9/93, IHT Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH and Uwe Danzinger v. Ideal-
Standard GmbH and Wabco Standard GmbH, 1994 E.C.R. 1-2789.
255. See Commission Regulation 2349/84 of 23 July 1984 on the Application of Article
85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Patent Licensing Agreements, 1984 O.J. (L 219) 15,
corrected by 1985 O.J. (L 13) 34.
256. See Commission Regulation 556/89/EEC of 30 November 1988 on the Application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Know-How Licensing Agreements, 1989
O.J. (L 61) 1.
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standards for trade secret protection, decided from case to case what
qualified for protection as a trade secret.
1. Article 81: From Troubled Beginnings to Recognition
Trade secrets have had a thorny way to their recognition by the
European Commission's Directorate General for Competition. In
Reuter/BASF,257 the first decision addressing trade secrets protection,
the Commission attacked the validity of a non-compete clause and a
know-how assignment agreement under Article 81(1). Dr. Gottfried
Reuter, a research chemist, sold his shares in Elastomer, a group of
companies dealing with manufacturing of polyurethanes. In a separate
agreement, Dr. Reuter transferred all his know-how and technology,
including documents containing most of the scientific and technical
data and know-how possessed by Elastomer AG, to one of BASF's
subsidiaries. The know-how agreement imposed an eight-year non-
compete obligation on Dr. Reuter; it also provided that Dr. Reuter
was not to divulge to any third party any protected or unprotected
know-how and experience in the relevant field. A few years later, Dr.
Reuter complained to the Commission that the non-compete
agreement was a threat to his "professional and economic livelihood,"
and that its duration should have been limited to what was necessary
to safeguard operations while the group was being transferred. BASF
pointed out that the non-compete agreement did not affect
competition, as there was a number of other producers active in the
relevant market. The essence of the transaction with Dr. Reuter was
the transfer of goodwill and technical know-how. BASF submitted
that the acquirer of know-how, like the acquirer of a patent, was
entitled to its sole use. The Commission decided that the restrictions
on using know-how and the non-compete agreement violated Article
81 (1). It reasoned that the post-transfer ban on use had to be limited in
time since the transfer of legally unprotected know-how confers no
exclusive rights on the purchaser. Under no circumstances could an
obligation to keep know-how secret from third parties be used to
prevent Dr. Reuter, after the expiry of the reasonable term of a non-
compete clause, from competing with BASF and developing the
transferred know-how. The Commission also questioned the
obligation of secrecy towards third parties, arguing that in view of the
rapid development of technology in polyurethane chemistry, it may be
questioned whether such know-how has at the present time sufficient
economic value to justify its continued protection by an obligation of
257. Commission Decision 76/743/EEC, 1976 O.J. (L 254) 40.
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secrecy. Under Reuter/BASF, restrictions on the use of know-how
were justified only in the context of a non-compete agreement and
only for the period necessary to ensure smooth transition of the
acquired company. The attack on the non-disclosure clause was
indicative of the Commission's hostility to trade secrets. This decision
effectively questioned the validity of know-how assignment and
licensing agreements. It is now seen as a mistake.
258
Two years later, the Commission took a more favorable view of
trade secrets in Campari25 9 when it confirmed the validity of an
exclusive license agreement under which licenses were provided with
a mixture of herbs and a recipe of how to make bitters by infusing
these herbs in local wines. The licensees bottled the wine and sold it
under the Campari brand in designated territories. Although the recipe
for the herbs was not disclosed, the instructions for making the wine
qualified as know-how. The Commission noted that the recipe was a
trade secret which the licensor cannot be required under Community
law to reveal to its licensees and that the fact that the licensees are
required to refrain from divulging the manufacturing processes to
third parties was essential if secret techniques or recipes are to be
passed on for use by other undertakings. The Commission decided
that the exclusivity of the licenses, the restraints on active sales
outside the assigned territory, and the obligation to buy the secret raw
materials from the licensor were contrary to Article 81 (1), but that
they could by exempted under Article 81(3) on the ground that they
did not go beyond what was necessary to ensure quality control by the
trademark holder.
Though Campari was a step in the right direction, it was not
enough to stamp out the consequences of the Reuter/BASF decision.
This happened in the 1980s, when the Commission took a more
favorable approach to IP, conceded that licensing was desirable, and
acknowledged that know-how had to be guarded by contractual
arrangements if its owner was not to lose the benefits of innovation.260
In 1984, the Commission granted a group exemption for patent
licenses 261 and, under specified conditions, mixed patent-and-know-
258. See VALENTINE KORAH, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AGREEMENTS AND THE EC
COMPETITION RULES 13-14 (1996).
259. Commission Decision 78/253/EEC, 1978 O.J. (L 70) 69.
260. See VALENTINE KORAH, KNOW-HOW LICENSING AGREEMENTS AND THE EEC
COMPETITION RULES REGULATION 556/89, 10-11 (1989). This was part of a general tendency
for more favorable treatment of IPRs.
261. Commission Regulation No 2349/84 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty
to Certain Categories of Patent Licensing Agreements, 1985 O.J. (L 280) 32.
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how licenses. The latter were covered as long as know-how permitted
better exploitation of the licensed patents and the licensed patents
were necessary in implementing the licensed technology.2 62 The block
exemption was very narrow and did not include pure know-how and
other licenses. This was a major problem: there was evidence that
U.S. firms were hesitant to grant technology licenses in Europe due to
doubts as to the validity of know-how licenses under EU competition
law.263
The ECJ addressed some of these concerns in its 1986 Pronuptia
judgment.264 The case involved franchise agreements setting up a
chain of wedding gown stores. The franchisees were given the
exclusive right to use the Pronuptia mark in specific territories. They
were obliged to equip their shops in accordance with the specification
of the franchisor, not to move its location, and obtain 80% of their
merchandise from the franchisor. The ECJ noted the importance of
trade secrets and stressed that:
[T]he franchisor must be able to communicate his know-how to the
franchisees and provide them with the necessary assistance in
order to enable them to apply his methods, without running the risk
that that know-how and assistance might benefit competitor, even
indirectly. It follows that provisions which are essential in order to
avoid that risk do not constitute restrictions on competition for the
purposes of Article [85(1)].265
Thus, the ECJ held that a number of restrictions designed to
protect know-how, such as non-compete clauses, restrictions on the
transferability of the franchisee's business or obligations to use the
know-how provided by the franchisor, were enforceable.266
Conversely, restrictions that the ECJ deemed unnecessary for the
protection of know-how or for the maintenance of network's identity
and reputation were held to violate competition law, and as such,
were unenforceable.267 Examples of such provisions are those which
262. In Boussois/Interpane, Commission Decision 87/123/EEC, 1987 O.J. (L 50) 30, the
Commission made it clear that a mixed license was not covered if the licensed know-how
dominated the technology and did not merely permit better exploitation of the licensed patents.
The Commission eventually granted an individual exemption in this case.
263. See STEVEN D. ANDERMAN, EC COMPETITION LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: THE REGULATION OF INNOVATION, 78-79 (1998).
264. Case 161/84, Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris lrmgard Schillgallis,
1986 E.C.R. 353.
265. Id. 16.
266. Id. 1 16-20.
267. Id. %123-25.
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shared markets between the franchisor and franchisees, those which
shared markets between franchisees, and those that prevented
franchisees from competing with each other.
Following suit, the Commission recognized the need for a more
coherent policy with respect to know-how licensing and adopted a
number of decisions confirming the legality of some common
restrictions contained in such agreements.268 One of these decisions
was Rich Products/Jus-rol,269 a case concerning a license of know-
how for the manufacture of frozen yeast dough products. The license
agreement granted Jus-rol an exclusive right to produce the licensed
product in the United Kingdom. It contained an obligation to keep the
know-how secret, not to grant sub-licenses, and banned the use of the
know-how by the licensee following termination of the agreement.
The Commission noted that the transfer of technical knowledge is in
principle a factor favorable to competition, since it enables firms
other than the owner of the know-how to exploit a body of technical
knowledge that has not been made public with a view to the
manufacture and sale of a product. It also acknowledged the existence
of the exclusive right which the owner enjoys over its know-how.
Thus, the obligation not to use the licensed know-how 10 years
following the termination of the agreement was not in violation of
Article 81(1), as long as know-how did not become a part of the
public domain, since the owner is free to decide whether it intends to
transfer the confidential information permanently or temporarily in
granting a license. The Commission found that the obligation to keep
the licensed know-how secret and the obligation not to grant sub-
licenses was outside the scope of Article 81(1), and so was a non-
exclusive grant-back clause contained in the agreement. The Rich
Products/Jus-rol decision opened a new era in the Commission's
approach to know-how and know-how licenses by explicitly
recognizing the existence of exclusive rights in know-how and the
legality of common provisions to be found in know-how licensing
agreements.27 °
268. These included the Boussois/Interpane decision as well as the following decisions:
Mitchell Cotts/Sofiltra, Commission Decision 87/100/EEC, 1987 O.J. (L 41) 31; Rich
Products/Jus-rol, Commission Decision 88/143/EEC, 1988 O.J. (L 69) 21; Delta Chemie/DDD,
Commission Decision 88/563/EEC, 1988 O.J. (L 309) 34; and Transocean Marine Paint Ass'n,
Commission Decision 88/635/EEC, 1988 O.J. (L 351) 40.
269. Rich Products/Jus-rol, Commission Decision 88/143/EEC, 1988 O.J. (L 69) 21.
270. For comment on the case, see, e.g., J. Kodwo Bentil, Favourable EEC Attitude
Towards Exclusive Know-How Licensing Agreements: The Jus-Rol Case, I I EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 291 (1989).
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The theories advanced in Rich Products/Jus-rol were
incorporated in the Commission's Know-How Block Exemption
Regulation, which received approval on 30 November 1988 and came
into force on April 1, 1989.271 The Commission noted:
[T]he increasing economic importance of non-patented technical
information (e. g. descriptions of manufacturing processes, recipes,
formulae, designs or drawings), commonly termed 'know-how',
the large number of agreements currently being concluded by
undertakings including public research facilities solely for the
exploitation of such information (so-called 'pure' know-how
licensing agreements) and the fact that the transfer of know-how is,
in practice, frequently irreversible make it necessary to provide
greater legal certainty with regard to the status of such agreements
under the competition rules, thus encouraging the dissemination of
technical knowledge in the Community.
21
In the absence of applicable Community laws, the regulation
defined "know-how" as substantial, secret, and identified technical
information. 273 The actual definition of these terms, which remains
valid until this day, is not particularly strict. "Secret" means that the
know-how package is not generally known or easily accessible. 74 The
regulation specifically states that the term should not be construed
narrowly so as to require every element to be totally unknown or
unobtainable outside the licensor's business. 275 "Substantial" means
that the know-how must be important for the whole or a significant
part of a manufacturing process or a product or service, or for the
development thereof.27 6 The licensed know-how must be useful in
improving the competitive position of the licensee.277 Thus, "know-
how" is limited to technical information. "Identified" means that the
271. Commission Regulation 556/89 on the Application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to
Certain Categories of Know-How Licensing Agreements, 1989 O.J. (L 61) 1 [hereinafter Know-
How Block Exemption Regulation]. This Regulation is discussed in detail in KORAH, supra note
250, and D.R. Price, The Secret of the Know-How Block Exemption, 10 EUR. COMPETITION L.
REv. 273 (1989).
272. Know-How Block Exemption Regulation at 1.




277. The requirement of substantiality is not very strictly defined; it suffices that the
licensed know-how can "reasonably be expected at the date of the conclusion of the agreement
to be capable of improving the competitive position of the licensee, for example by helping him
to enter a new market or giving him an advantage in competition with other manufacturers or
providers of services who do not have access to the licensed secret know-how or other
comparable secret know-how." Id.
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know-how must be described or recorded so as to make it possible to
verify that it fulfilled the criteria of secrecy and substantiality. 278 The
definition is quite limited when compared to the definitions of a trade
secret used in national laws. It appears that the Commission was
anxious to make sure that the block exemption would otherwise
encourage cartels to operate customer/market-sharing under the
auspices of a license of trivial know-how.
27 9
The Know-How Block Exemption Regulation provided a safe
harbor for a narrowly defined class of pure know-how and mixed
patent-and-know-how licenses.28 ° It contained a list of "white,"
permitted clauses which did not infringe Article 8 1(1), and a blacklist
of provisions that precluded the application of the exemption. The
white list contained clauses typically found in know-how licenses that
relate to protection of the licensed know how such as an obligation
not to divulge the know-how, a ban on sub-licensing and assignments,
a post-term use ban, and an obligation to inform about
infringements. 281 The permitted restrictions included certain
restrictions as to exclusivity, territoriality, 282 and field-of-use. Among
the blacklisted restrictions were resale price maintenance, tie-ins, non-
challenge clauses, customer restrictions, automatic renewals of the
agreement, post-term use ban when the know-how is in the public
domain, and exclusive grant-backs. Such restrictions were deemed
illegal regardless of whether the relation between the parties was of
vertical or horizontal nature; the parties' market shares were not taken
into account. If a license included clauses not listed in the Regulation
as permissible, it had to be notified to the Commission, which had an
option of opposing it.
283
The Know-How Block Exemption Regulation treated know-how
licenses essentially in the same manner as patent licenses were treated
278. Id.
279. See Price, supra note 271, at 275.
280. Under Article 1, such agreements did not violate Article 8 1(1) of the EC Treaty. The
Know-How Block Exemption Regulation applied only to bilateral agreements; it did not cover
agreements relating to marketing know-how communicated in the context of franchising
arrangements, joint ventures, know-how pools, and cross-licenses. See Know-How Block
Exemption Regulation, art 5, 1989 O.J. (L 61) 1.
281. Id. at art. 2.
282. In particular, these included: 1) an exploitation ban (including a ban on active and
passive sales) in areas reserved for the licensor; 2) a manufacture/use ban in areas licensed to
other licensees; 3) an active sales ban in areas licensed to other licensees; 4) a passive sales ban
in areas licensed to other licensees; and 5) exclusive licenses. Id.
283. Id. at art. 4.
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under the 1984 Patent Block Exemption Regulation.2 84 However,
unlike in the case of patent licenses, the exemption for territorial
restrictions in know-how licenses was limited to ten years from the
day the first license agreement was signed (the same restriction did
not apply to patent licenses). The Commission explained that this was
necessary since it would be difficult to determine when the licensed
know-how ceases to be secret otherwise.285 This explanation is not
entirely persuasive, since this feature of know-how has an impact on
the duration of the agreement as a whole. If the know-how required a
substantial investment and the parties believed that a longer period
was necessary to implement their agreement, they would have to
apply to the Commission for an individual exemption.286
Both the Know-How Block Exemption Regulation and the
Patent Block Exemption Regulation were formalistic, narrow, and
overly restrictive. The antitrust assessment of the agreements was
made irrespective of the parties' market shares and the nature of their
relations. The Commission's policy largely resembled the Department
of Justice's infamous Nine No-No's.
287
The more IP friendly and economic-based approach, which
prevailed in the 1990s, resulted in further reforms. In "recognition of
the stimulus provided by technology transfers to economic
development in today's society[,] 288 the Commission initiated
consultations which resulted in the adoption of the Technology
Transfer Block Exemption Regulation (TTBER) in 1996.289 The
TTBER removed disparities between the old patent and know-how
block exemptions 290 and liberalized competition rules applicable to
technology licensing. It covered bilateral agreements for pure patent
284. See KORAH, supra note 250, at 51.
285. Know-How Block Exemption Regulation, 7.
286. See Sergio Baches Opi, The Approaches of the European Commission and the U.S.
Antitrust Agencies Towards Exclusivity Clauses in Licensing Agreements, 24 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 85, 126-27 (2000).
287. See supra Part IV(A).
288. See Jean-Frangois Pons, Competition and Dissemination of Innovation. The New
Block Exemption Regulation for Technology Transfer Agreements, May 06, 1996,
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp1996 020 en.html
289. Commission Regulation 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the Application of Article 85
(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 1996 O.J. (L 31) 2.
290. There was an overlap as to the mixed patent-and-know-how agreements between the
two technology transfer regulations, which meant that in the case of mixed patent-and-know-
how agreements, companies were unsure as to which regulation applied. See, e.g., KORAH,
supra note 250, at 79-80; Chris Mitropoulos, Technology Transfer: the New Regulation, 2 EC
COMPETITION POL'YNEWSL., No. 1 (1996).
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licensing, pure know-how licensing, mixed licenses of patents29 I and
know-how, and ancillary provisions regarding non-patent IPRs.
Licensing of copyrights, designs, trademarks, or software fell outside
the ambit of the TTBER except when the licensing of such rights was
clearly ancillary to the main purpose of the agreement. In general, the
exemption provided by the regulation was broader and simpler than
that under the earlier group exemption regulations. Nonetheless, the
1996 TTBER remained limited in scope and inflexible, with lists of
"white" clauses, which could be included in a licensing agreement,
and "black", illegal, clauses.29 2 It also upheld the distinction between
the treatment of territorial restrictions between patent and know-how
licenses, allowing the know-how agreement to be exempted only for a
period of ten years.
The evolution of EC competition law applicable to technology
transfers culminated in 2004, when the new TTBER 293 and the
Guidelines on Transfer of Technology 294 were adopted. Following
the Commission Report of December 2001 and the public debate on
the rules concerning technology licensing in Europe, the Commission
released a draft TTBER and draft Technology Transfer Guidelines.
295
The drafts were uniformly criticized as being too restrictive. After
further consultations, the TTBER and the Technology Transfer
Guidelines were somewhat liberalized; they both came into force on
May 1, 2004. The new TTBER is wider in scope than the 1996
TTBER; 296 it is based on the same core principles as the U.S.
291. Patent applications, utility models, and supplementary protection certificates (SPCs)
for pharmaceutical products were treated like patents.
292. See European Commission, Commission Evaluation Report on the Transfer of
Technology Block Exemption Regulation No 240/96: Technology Transfer Agreements Under
Article 81, 5 (December 2001),
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/technologytransfer/en.pdf (last visited Oct. 14,
2007).
293. Commission Regulation 772/2004 on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to
Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 11 [hereinafter new
TTBER].
294. Commission Notice: Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to
Technology Transfer Agreements, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 2 [hereinafter Technology Transfer
Guidelines].
295. Competition Rules Relating to Technology Transfer Agreements, 2003 O.J. (C 235)
10.
296. It applies not only to patent (including patent applications, utility models, and SPCs)
and know-how licenses, but also to agreements concerning software copyright. At the same
time, the new TTBER is narrower than its predecessors in that it applies if the parties have
market shares that do not exceed the levels provided for in Article 3 of the new TTBER. These
thresholds are low: 20% of combined market shares, if the parties are competitors, or 30% each,
if the relation between companies is of a vertical nature. There is no presumption that a license
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Licensing Guidelines: (1) licensing is generally considered pro-
competitive; 297 and (2) anti-competitive effects are most likely to
occur when there is market power, but market power cannot be
inferred from IPRs alone. 298 In comparison with the older block
exemptions, the new TTBER is more firmly based on economic
principles: horizontal and vertical restraints are assessed differently
and the market power of the involved parties is taken into account.29 9
The list of blacklisted hardcore restraints is shorter in comparison to
the 1996 TTBER and contains essentially classic cartel provisions:
price fixing, allocation of markets, and output limitations. The list of
hardcore restrictions is different depending on whether the licensor
and licensee compete with each other. 300 The new TTBER does not
exempt exclusive grant-backs and non-challenge clauses, but their
inclusion in the license does not preclude the application of the block
exemption to other provisions. 30 1 Unlike the older block-exemptions,
it does not contain a "white list" of acceptable clauses.
In the first draft of the new TTBER, the Commission narrowed
the scope of the definition of know-how by requiring that the
information be "indispensable" rather than just "useful" for the
manufacture or supply of the contract products. Following an outcry
from the industry and legal scholars, the Commission withdrew this
idea and the new TTBER did not introduce significant changes to the
definition of know-how, as compared with the 1988 and 1996
TTBERs.3 °2 In the new TTBER, the Commission acknowledges the
agreement between parties with market shares exceeding these thresholds violates EU
competition rules, but the companies involved cannot benefit from the safe harbor of the
TTBER, making it less useful to many companies and increasing legal uncertainty. See KORAH,
supra note 250, at 45-46; ALISON JONES & BRENDA SuFRIN, EC COMPETITION LAW 720 (2d ed.
2004).
297. New TTBER at 9 5; see also Technology Transfer Guidelines at 9 9 and 17. It is
explicitly confirmed that IPRs as such do not give rise to competition concerns, and that in fact
technology transfer agreements usually improve economic efficiency and are pro-competitive, in
particular because they reduce duplication of R&D, strengthen the incentive for the initial R&D
and spur incremental innovation by increasing expected returns, facilitate diffusion, and
generate product market competition.
298. New TTBER at 9 6; see also Technology Transfer Guidelines at 9 15.
299. For a comment on the new TTBER, see, e.g., KORAH, supra note 250, at 45-76;
JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 297, at 720-38.
300. New TTBER, art. 4. Just as in the case of older block exemptions, inclusion of the
blacklisted provisions is not only illegal and void in itself, but also prevents the application of
the block exemption to the other provisions in the license.
301. Id. at art. 5.
302. Id. at art. 1, § 1 (i). The Technology Transfer Guidelines offers further guidance on the
notion of "substantial" as follows:
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status of know-how as IP: the regulation defines "IPRs" as including
"industrial property rights, know-how, copyright and neighboring
rights. 3 °3 Unlike the 1988 and 1996 TTBERs, the new TTBER
allows exemption for territorial restrictions in know-how licenses
until the licensed know-how is no longer secret, or, in the event that
secrecy has been compromised by the license, the length of the
agreement. It is fair to say that the new TTBER and the Technology
Transfer Guidelines treat know-how as a form of IP; anticompetitive
restraints in patent and know-how licenses are assessed broadly in the
same manner.
The new rules on the transfer of technology brought EU antitrust
rules applicable to IP licensing closer to the 1995 U.S. Licensing
Guidelines. However, unlike their U.S. counterparts, EU antitrust
enforcers failed to account for the specific features of know-how. The
legal protection of the licensed patent is secured by the exclusive
rights stemming from the patent itself, the only protection which a
know-how licensor has, in relation to the know-how, lies in the
licensing agreement itself. In addition, unlike a patent, know-how
does not exclude independent innovation or reverse engineering,
which means that a network of know-how licenses is more likely
challenged by the new entry than a network of patent licenses. It also
remains unclear why the European Commission has to adopt a special
definition of know-how for the purpose of antitrust law. The
argument that know-how licenses could be used to cover cartel
arrangements is not very convincing. Most cartel arrangements are
clandestine. Typically, rather than trying to cover their agreement by
disguised licenses, cartel participants concentrate on keeping the
paper-trail to a minimum. If the concern really is sham know-how
[T]he information must significantly contribute to or facilitate the production of
the contract products. In cases where the licensed know-how relates to a product
as opposed to a process, this condition implies that the know-how is useful for
the production of the contract product. This condition is not satisfied where the
contract product can be produced on the basis of freely available technology.
However, the condition does not require that the contract product is of higher
value than products produced with freely available technology. In the case of
process technologies, this condition implies that the know-how is useful in the
sense that it can reasonably be expected at the date of conclusion of the
agreement to be capable of significantly improving the competitive position of
the licensee, for instance by reducing his production costs.
Technology Transfer Guidelines at 47. Know-how is defined in a similar manner in Article 2,
§ 10 of Commission Regulation 2659/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the Application of Article
81(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Research and Development Agreements, 2000 O.J. (L 304)
7.
303. New TTBER, art. 1, § l(g).
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licenses, a provision excluding such arrangements from the block
exemption could be included in the TTBER instead of the definition
of know-how, which has the undesirable effect of limiting the legal
certainty when it comes to licensing a large body of information
which is eligible for protection as trade secrets in the Member States.
The Commission's approach was followed by some of the
Member States, which adopted their own definitions of know-how for
the purpose of applying their national competition law. 304 This
situation only increases the uncertainty about trade secrets protection
and means for their legal exploitation in Europe.
2. Trade Secrets and Article 82: The Confusing Message
of Microsoft
Since the early 1990s, there have been a few cases in which a
refusal to license an IPR was held to be anticompetitive and a
compulsory license was ordered as a remedy. These cases have been
analyzed extensively elsewhere; 30 5  suffice it to say that they
established rather strict conditions for compulsory licensing of
IPRs.3°6 The Microsoft case30 7 is the first instance where Article 82
has been applied to information protected by a bundle of IPRs
including patent, copyrights, and trade secrets.308 It is groundbreaking,
304. This is the case, for example, in Poland. See §2(2) of Rozporzqdzenie Rady
Ministr6w z dnia 30 lipca 2002 r. w sprawie wylelczenia niekt6rych kategorii porozumiefi
dotyczacych transferu technologii spod zakazu porozumieh ograniczajacych konkurencjq
[Council of Ministers Regulation of July 30, 2002 on the block exemption of some categories of
agreements involving tranfer of technologies from the prohibition of the agreements limiting
competition], Official Journal 2002, No. 137, item. 1152.
305. See, e.g., KORAH, supra note 250, at 133-167; Roberto Pardolesi & Andrea Renda,
The European Commission 's Case against Microsoft: Kill Bill?, 27 WORLD COMPETITION 513
(2004); Frangois Ldv~que, Innovation, leveraging and essential facilities: interoperability
licensing in the EU Microsoft case, 28 WORLD COMPETITION 71 (2005); Ian S. Forrester, Article
82: Remedies in Search of Theories?, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 919 (2005); Damien Geradin,
Limiting the scope of Article 82 EC: What can the EU learn from the U.S. Supreme Court's
judgment in Trinko in the wake of Microsoft, IMS, and Deutsche Telekom?, 41 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 1519 (2004). These cases are analyzed in more detail in Katarzyna A. Czapracka, Where
Antitrust Ends and IP Begins - On the Roots of the Transatlantic Clashes, 9 YALE J. L. & TECH.
44 (2007).
306. All cases decided so far in the EU concerned copyrights.
307. Commission Decision of 24.03.2004 relating to a Proceeding under Article 82 of the
EC Treaty (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft), COM (2004) 900 final (Apr. 21, 2004)
[hereinafter Microsoft Decision].
308. An exception is the IBM case, in which IBM's strategy adopted in response to
increasing competition from "plug-compatible" manufacturers was attacked. IBM began
bundling peripheral equipment control functions into its mainframe hardware and changed from
a full disclosure policy to keeping operating system software source code secret, limiting and
delaying interface disclosures. The Commission alleged that this strategy was an abuse of
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first, because the Commission proposes a new test to be applied in
compulsory licensing cases, which seems to extend the scope of
antitrust intervention as compared to earlier case-law, and, second,
because the Commission takes a rather controversial position on the
status of trade secrets. The focus of this section is on the second
aspect of the Microsoft decision and the litigation that ensued.
In essence, Microsoft was accused of having refused to supply
"interoperability information" to competitors for the purpose of
developing their own technology in making operating systems for
server computers performing so-called work-group functions.30 9 The
triggering event for the case against Microsoft was Sun's complaint
alleging that Microsoft's refusal to supply the technology necessary to
allow interoperability of its work group server operating system with
the Windows Client PC operating system constituted an abuse of a
dominant position. 1 ° Sun essentially claimed that Microsoft's refusal
to fully disclose interoperability information created an unfair
advantage for Microsoft in the work group server operating systems
market because Sun's work group server operating system could not
interact with Windows PC operating system as well as Microsoft's
work group server operating system.
After reviewing the applicable case law, including Magill,3 11 a
case in which compulsory licensing of copyrights was ordered, the
Commission decided that there is no particular set of circumstances
dominance. The case was eventually settled and a formal decision was not adopted. Under the
settlement, IBM agreed to license the interface information sufficient to allow hardware and
software manufacturers to design their products so that they can be used with its computers.
IBM was entitled to charge royalties and impose confidentiality obligations in the license. IBM
was also required to support international standards for open system interconnection for the
products, systems, and networks of different manufacturers. See The Community. v. IBM,
[1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 147, 148-49, 152-55, 160-61 (1984).
309. Microsoft was accused of having integrated improved media functionality into its
Windows personal computer operating systems without simultaneously offering a version of
Windows without that media functionality. The violation was not the adding of the new features
but the failure to offer at the same time a version lacking those features. As a remedy for this
infringement, Microsoft had to develop a "fully-functioning" version of Windows which did not
support certain media functionality and license it to customers in Europe on reasonable and non-
discriminatory terms.
310. In 1998, Sun requested Microsoft to provide the complete information required to
allow Sun's software to fully cooperate with Microsoft's software. The request pertained to
client-to-server and server-to-server interoperability. See Microsoft Decision, COM (2004) 900
final (Apr. 21, 2004), 185-187.
311. Commission Decision 89/205/EEC of 21 December 1988 (Magill TV Guide/ITP,
BBC and RTE), 1989 O.J. (L 78) 43, upheld by the Court of First Instance (CFI) in Case T-
69/89, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. 11-485, upheld on appeal by the ECJ in
Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Indep. Television Publ'ns
Ltd. (ITP) v. Comm'n, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743.
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making a refusal to share IP illegal. Instead, the Commission decided
that all relevant circumstances surrounding the refusal to supply must
be taken into account for the purpose of applying Article 82.312
Microsoft's refusal to supply the information requested by Sun was
abusive and not objectively justified because "on balance, the possible
negative impact of an order to supply on Microsoft's incentives to
innovate is outweighed by its positive impact on the level of
innovation of the whole industry (including Microsoft)." '3 13 Thus, the
Commission acknowledged that the information Microsoft was asked
to share with its competitors may have value which justifies its
protection under trade secret laws; however, these considerations are
outweighed by the pro-competitive effects that the sharing of this
information will have on the market. This test appears arbitrary,
particularly in light of the fact that the Commission gives little
guidance on how to assess the value of the information at stake, the
effect that the disclosure of the information will have on the
incentives to innovate, and the pro-competitive effects of compulsory
licensing. Although the CFI upheld the Commission's finding that
Microsoft violated Article 82 by refusing to provide its rivals with
interoperability information, its ruling casts doubt on the validity of
the balancing test.314 In its assessment whether Microsoft's refusal to
license violated Article 82 of the EC Treaty, the court relied on the
test established by the European Court of Justice in Magill and
confirmed in the IMS case.315 Further, the CFI ruled, rather
disapprovingly, that the Commission did not, in fact, establish a new
test under which refusals to license should be assessed under Article
312. In this case, the Commission took into account the following factors in particular: the
indispensability of the technology; the risk of elimination of competition; the negative impact on
technical development to the prejudice of consumers; the absence of objective justification; and
the disruption of previous levels of supply of technology. The test developed by the Commission
significantly differs from the criteria for a compulsory license adopted by the ECJ in Magill and
confirmed in the IMS case (Commission Decision 2001/165/EC of 3 July 2001 (NDC
Health/IMS Health: Interim Measures), 2002 O.J. (L 59) 18, withdrawn by Commission
Decision 2003/741/EC of 13 August 2003 (NDC Health/IMS Health: Interim Measures), 2003
O.J. (L 268) 69; Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co.
KG, 2004 E.C.R. 1-5039. In the IMS case, the court stated that compulsory licensing would only
be ordered in "exceptional circumstances" where: 1) the product or service protected by
intellectual property is indispensable for carrying on a particular business; 2) the refusal
prevents the emergence of a new product for which there is a potential consumer demand; 3) the
refusal is not objectively justified; and 4) the refusal is such as to exclude all competition on the
secondary market. Id. 37.
313. See Microsoft Decision, COM (2004) 900 final (Apr. 21, 2004), 783.
314. Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission, 666-710 [hereinafter Microsoft
Judgment] (not yet reported).
315. Id. at 332-35. For the discussion of the IMS test see note 315.
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82, but rather, that the balancing test was a part of the assessment of
whether Microsoft's refusal to deal was objectively justified.3 1 6
The EU case against Microsoft presented certain similarities with
the U.S. Microsoft case, and the Commission conceded that the U.S.
settlement31 7 had addressed some of its concerns. In particular,
Section III.E of the U.S. Settlement required Microsoft to make
available licenses to Communications Protocols that Windows clients
used to communicate with Windows servers for the purpose of
allowing third party products to interoperate with those Windows
clients on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. 318 Microsoft
made licenses for the Communications Protocols available beginning
in August 2002, in accordance with the timing requirements of the
Final Judgments. 31 9 Microsoft provided licensees with technical
documentation that described each Communication Protocol, as well
as licenses to Microsoft's relevant patents, copyrights, and trade
secrets pertaining to the licensed technology. 320 The requirement to
disclose interoperability information was limited to interfaces and
other technical information used by Microsoft's applications to
interoperate with its operating system. It did not cover the
specifications for its server-to-server communications protocols,
although it did require Microsoft to license all the protocols
implemented in a Windows Client PC operating system used for
interoperating with a Windows server operating system. The goal of
the licensing obligation under the U.S. settlement was to protect
opportunities for the development and use of non-Microsoft
middleware by ensuring that competing, non-Microsoft server
products on which such middleware could be hosted and served
would have the same access and ability to interoperate with Windows
321
operating system products as Microsoft's server operating systems.
In addition, the government wanted to make sure that the non-
316. Id. at 706-10.
317. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2002) (judgment
adopting plaintiffs' Third Revised Proposed Final Judgment).
318. See Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at 22
(July 3, 2003) (No. 98-1232 (CKK)), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f20l100/201135.pdf. To
date, a number of companies have licensed Microsoft's protocol technology. Id. at 22-23.
319. Id. at 22.
320. Id. Microsoft worked to improve its licensing program and declared that the licensing
program would continue past the expiry of the decree. See Joint Status Report on Microsoft's
Compliance with the Final Judgments at 6-8 (August 30, 2006) (No. 98-1232 (CKK)), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f218000/218096.pdf.
321. See United States v. Microsoft Corporation; Revised Proposed Final Judgment and
Competitive Impact Statement, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,452, 59,469 (Nov. 28, 2001).
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Microsoft server operating systems could interoperate, or
communicate, with the ubiquitous Windows PC client.322 In the
Commission's view, this was insufficient, as the information provided
by Microsoft did not create a level playing field between Microsoft
and its competitors in the market for work group server operating
systems. Microsoft's rivals needed more interoperability information
to compete effectively with Microsoft. The Commission concluded
that Microsoft's refusal to supply this information was abusive
because the interoperability information was an essential facility and
a refusal to supply it amounted to illegal leveraging and resulted in
market foreclosure. The remedies imposed by the Commission go
further than the U.S. settlement. The Commission ordered Microsoft
to disclose complete and accurate specifications for the protocols
necessary for its competitors' server products to be able to interact on
an equal footing with Windows PCs, and hence compete on a level
playing field.323 In particular, the Commission required the disclosure
of certain server-to-server protocols not covered by the U.S. case.
Microsoft maintained that the information to be delivered to
competitors was secret, protected by copyright and covered by
patents, and the fruit of years of engineering effort.3 24 The
Commission initially questioned whether the interoperability
information that Microsoft was asked to deliver was covered by
325 asre aetIPRs, and asserted that in any case the duty to provide the
interoperability information would not violate Microsoft's IPRs.326
The Commission also relied on the Software Directive, which
explicitly allows reverse engineering for the purpose of achieving
322. See N.Y. v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 172-73 (D.D.C. 2002).
323. A "protocol" as defined in Article 1(2) of the Microsoft Decision refers to "a set of
rules of interconnection and interaction between various instances of Windows Work Group
Server Operating Systems and Windows Client PC Operating Systems running on different
computers in a Windows Work Group Network." See Microsoft Decision, COM (2004) 900 final
(Apr. 21, 2004) 9 2. The Commission emphasized that the remedy does not relate to elements of
Microsoft's source code but solely to the specifications for the protocols in question.
324. Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission, 9 267-74, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang-en
325. In particular, it has been pointed out that the communications protocols in dispute are
not truly valuable or innovative, and that the patents or pending patent applications which
covered the communications protocols might be invalid, or might not be issued, or alternatively
that the licensees might have been able to find means of implementing the licensed technology
so as to avoid the techniques over which Microsoft held patent protection.
326. See CFI order in Case T-201/04 R 2, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 99 167-84
[hereinafter CFI order], available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pllang-en.
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interoperability. 327 The Commission reasoned that a secret technology
does not deserve more protection than one which has been publicly
disclosed. It asserted that the principles applicable to refusals to
license other forms of IP developed by the EU Courts should not
apply to trade secrets because the act of not licensing an IP right
created by law is fundamentally different to that of not revealing a
'secret', the existence of which merely results from a unilateral
business decision. 328 Under competition law, legitimacy of a refusal to
reveal a "secret" should depend upon the interest at stake,329 and
secret information is not protected in the same way as other forms of
IP. In support of this view, the Commission relied on the Court of
First Instance (CFI) judgment in Tetra Pak H.330 The case concerned a
clause contained in contracts for the sale or lease of Tetra Pak's
packaging machines, requesting supplies of cartons for use with the
machines to be obtained exclusively from Tetra Pak or a supplier
designated by it. Tetra Pak argued that the tying arrangement was
objectively justified by the concern to protect public health and its
reputation through control of the entire packaging process. The CFI
replied that Tetra Pak's reputation and reliability of its packaging
equipment could have been safeguarded by "disclosing to users of
Tetra Pak machines all the technical specifications concerning the
cartons to be used on those systems, without the applicant's IPRs
being thereby prejudiced., 331 Yet, in Tetra Pak II, the CFI merely
suggested, in the context of a tying agreement, that there was a less
restrictive method of safeguarding reputation: selling or licensing of
know-how necessary to use the machine in an appropriate manner.
The CFI was not asked to determine whether the specifications in
question were protected as trade secrets.
The Commission's position on refusals to provide confidential
information was confirmed in the Article 82 Discussion Paper, which
outlines an agenda for the reform of EU law of abuse of
dominance. 332 Reflecting on antitrust liability in refusal to deal cases,
327. Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42; see also Microsoft Decision, 32-36.
328. Microsoft judgment, 280 and 302.
329. See CFI order, 126, 182 and Microsoft judgment, 280.
330. Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak Int'l SA v. Comm'n, 1994 E.C.R. 11-755, 84, 139
[hereinafter Tetra Pak II].
331. Id. 139.
332. European Commission, DG Competition discussion paper on the application of
Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses (Dec. 2005) [hereinafter Article 82 Discussion
Paper], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/discpaper2005.pdf.
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the Commission asserted that a refusal to supply interoperability
information should be treated differently than a refusal to license IP
rights.333 The Commission conceded that "there is no general
obligation even for dominant companies to ensure interoperability.3 34
However, a refusal to supply interoperability information by a
dominant company which allows it to leverage its market power from
one market to another may be an abuse of a dominant position.335 The
Commission did not specify whether, as one could expect, a refusal to
provide interoperability information must also create a risk of a total
foreclosure in a secondary market. It seems reasonable to assume it
would be necessary to prove anticompetitive effects. Most dominant
companies have some degree of control over interoperability
standards, which naturally gives them an advantage in neighboring
markets. Unless there is a requirement of a risk of a total foreclosure,
any vertical integration by a dominant company could be challenged
and a dominant company would be under the obligation to create a
level-playing field for its competitors in neighboring markets. The
standard required for a refusal to supply interoperability information
to be deemed abusive is lower than the standard applied to assess a
refusal to license other forms of IP. With respect to the latter, the
Commission seems to take a more cautious position. Drawing from
ECJ jurisprudence, the Commission acknowledged that "[o]nly under
exceptional circumstances can the refusal to license an IPR be
considered an abuse. 33 6 In particular, a refusal to license may be
condemned if it leads to market foreclosure, has no objective
justification, and "prevents the development of the market for which
the license is an indispensable input, to the detriment of
consumers."
337
The Commission acknowledged that such an interpretation of
Article 82 practically eliminates the existence of trade secret rights
that the dominant company may have in the interoperability
information. However, it took the view that even if trade secrets are
involved, it may not be appropriate to apply the same high standards
to a refusal to share such information as to those that are applied if
333. Compare 23740 (refusal to license IPRs) and 241-42 (refusal to supply
interoperability information) of the Article 82 Discussion Paper. Id.
334. Id. 241.
335. Id. The Commission characterizes a refusal to supply interoperability information as a
"special case" among refusals to deal.
336. Id. 239.
337. Id.
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other forms of IP are involved.338 It is not clear whether the lower
standard should apply in all cases where trade secrets are involved or
rather solely in cases where interoperability information is at stake.
The differentiation between trade secrets and other forms of IP is not
justified taken that it may be possible to obtain patents, copyrights,
designs, and other IPRs to protect some or all aspects of a secret
technology. The value of the subject matter of a trade secret and that
of an IPR is often impossible to quantify. In both cases, the antitrust
intervention comes at a price of undermining the incentives to
innovate. The Commission seems to neglect that and essentially
makes it impossible for dominant companies to use their trade secrets.
The EU rules applicable to compulsory licensing of IP are
neither clear nor straightforward. The Microsoft decision, the CFI
judgment upholding the decision, and the Article 82 Discussion Paper
further blur the picture. The theory advanced by the Commission, as
confirmed in the Article 82 Discussion Paper, is that competition law
may more readily compel a license in a case involving trade secrets
than in a case involving other IP interests. Yet, it is neither clear what
are exactly the standards applicable to a refusal to license trade
secrets, nor that such a different treatment is justified. Ordering
disclosure not only destroys trade secrets, but also precludes the
proprietor from obtaining a patent on the invention at stake, and
eliminates the incentives to innovate. The Commission disregards
special features of trade secrets such as the ease of misappropriation,
the need to protect secrecy, and the fact that their existence does not
preclude competitors from developing or reverse engineering the
information at stake. The Commission seems to ignore the economic
effects of reverse engineering in its analysis of refusals to provide
interoperability information and competitive concerns resulting from
trade secrets. In the Article 82 Discussion Paper, it assumes that trade
secrets afford a similar degree of exclusivity and create similar
barriers to entry as patents. When analyzing market power in after-
markets, the Commission stated that "[o]ften patents or know-how
will allow the supplier of the primary product to have a monopolistic
position on the aftermarket, ' '339 which indicates that the Commission
treats patents and know-how alike as a strong indication of market
power in after-markets.
The reasoning adopted by the Commission in the Microsoft
decision, as confirmed by the CFI, significantly differs from the
338. Id. 242.
339. Id. 245.
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ECJ's recent line of essential facilities case law. Since Bronner,340 the
ECJ has been skeptical about imposing a duty to deal on a dominant
company. Bronner involved a small newspaper publisher of a
newspaper and Mediaprint, a bigger publishing house that operated
the only nationwide newspaper home-delivery scheme. The combined
market share of Mediaprint's newspapers was 46.8% of total
circulation and 42% of total advertising revenues. Bronner, the small
publisher, argued that under the doctrine of essential facilities as
established by the ECJ, Mediaprint was obliged to allow, at market
prices, access to the home-delivery service by competing products.
The ECJ firmly rejected the argument that a dominant company is
obliged to create a level playing field for its competitors. It suggested
that refusal would constitute an abuse only if the home-delivery
service was indispensable to the carrying on of the business of the
person requesting the service. A product or service is indispensable if
there are no products or services which constitute alternative
solutions, even if they are less advantageous, or if there are no
technical, legal, or economic obstacles capable of making it
impossible or at least unreasonably difficult for any undertaking
seeking to operate in the market to create, possibly in cooperation
with other operators, the alternative products or services.3 4' In order to
accept the existence of economic obstacles, it must be established, at
the very least, that the creation of those products or services is not
economically viable for production on a scale comparable to that of
the undertaking which controls the existing product or service.34 2 In
IMS,343 a case concerning a refusal to license a copyrighted scheme of
geographical division of Germany, the CFI embraced the
indispensability requirement of Bronner.344 It further added that a
refusal to license a valid IPR does not, of itself, constitute an abuse of
a dominant position.345 A refusal to license may be abusive only in
exceptional circumstances.346 The CFI noted that the ECJ had
340. Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und
Zeitschriftenverlag GrnbH, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791 [hereinafter Bronner].
341. Id. 43, 44.
342. Id.146.
343. Case T-184/01 R, IMS Health v. Comm'n, 2001 E.C.R. 11-3193 [hereinafter IMS],
upheld on appeal in Case C-481/01 P(R), NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG and NDC Health Corp.
v.Comm'n and IMS Health Inc., 2002 E.C.R. 1-3401. The original decision was withdrawn by
Commission Decision 2003/741 of 13 August 2003 NDC Health/IMS Health: Interim Measures,




2008] ANTITRUST AND TRADE SECRETS: THE U.S. & EU 269
interpreted its earlier case law as establishing three cumulative
conditions making a refusal to license of an indispensable product
abusive: if the refusal 1) prevents the emergence of a new product for
which there is a potential consumer demand, 2) it is unjustified, and
3) it excludes any competition on a secondary market.34 7 In the
Microsoft decision, the Commission assessed the refusal to deal under
different standards. Furthermore, the Commission required of a
dominant company more than access to an essential facility: it
required disclosing so much interoperability information as to create
"full interoperability," a level playing field between the dominant
company and its competitors. The level playing field requirement
made the implementation of the Microsoft decision troublesome.
Quite predictably, a dispute arose as to which protocols had to be
disclosed and how much protection they deserve, which gave rise to
further legal disputes.348
One way to explain the onerous responsibilities imposed on
Microsoft are the circumstances of the case. Indeed, in the Article 82
Discussion Paper, the Commission took the view that the conduct of
"super-dominant" companies should be assessed under more stringent
standards. 349 At the same time, the principles relating to refusals to
provide interoperability information established in the Article 82
Discussion Paper suggest that the Commission meant to establish a
precedent. If this is the case, the Microsoft decision is very troubling.
Unfortunately, the long-awaited CFI ruling does not provide
decisive answers to the legal questions relating to treatment of trade
secrets raised by the Microsoft case. Importantly, the CFI specifically
refused to rule on the question whether trade secrets should be treated
as intellectual property rights for the purpose of applying Article
82.350 Taken that the Commission conceded that IP rights might have
been involved, the CFI held that it was necessary to assume that
347. Id. 1 95-98.
348. In July 2006, the Commission issued a Decision holding that Microsoft was not
complying with its obligation to supply complete and accurate interoperability information and
to make that information available on reasonable terms. The Decision imposed a penalty
payment of E280.5 million on Microsoft and threatened it with a daily penalty payment of up to
E3 million, should it continue its non-compliance. In late November 2006, Microsoft submitted
a revised version of the Technical Documentation with a view to meeting these requirements.
Microsoft also challenged the non-compliance decision before the ECJ. See Press Release,
European Commission, Competition: Commission imposes penalty payment of E280.5 million
on Microsoft for continued non-compliance with March 2004 Decision, (July 12, 2006),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/979&guiLanguage=en.
349. See Article 82 Discussion Paper, supra note 332, 59, 91-92.
350. Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission, 283-89.
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Microsoft was able to rely on intellectual property rights in this
case.351 Further, although the CFI applied the test coined by the
European Court of Justice in cases involving refusals to license IP
rights, it seemed to have indicated that other circumstances, such as
those listed by the Commission, may be relevant for the finding that a
refusal to license was abusive. 352 Still, the Court failed to give its
opinion on the additional circumstances which can make a refusal to
deal abusive.
The implementation of the Commission's decision has created
further questions as to exactly how much protection Microsoft's trade
secrets should be given. The Commission intended that open source
software developers benefit from the technology disclosed by
Microsoft,353 yet, open source software cannot be based on
technology supplied under a traditional software license, which
requires the licensee to protect trade secrets. To solve this problem,
the Commission required Microsoft not to charge royalties for
interoperability information lacking "significant innovation. '" 354 In
addition, the Commission required Microsoft to allow the publication
of software source code developed by the licensees and based on
Microsoft's interface documentation, unless the interfaces in question
"do not embody innovations." 355 Consequently, if no "innovation" is
involved, third party software developers are allowed to access
Microsoft's trade secrets without giving Microsoft the possibility of
ensuring that its trade secrets are kept confidential through licensing
terms as is the case for licensees. This effectively destroys
Microsoft's trade secrets that do not embody innovations. 356
The Commission Decision creates two categories of trade
secrets: those "embodying innovation," which deserve some level of
deference from antitrust enforcers, and those that are not innovative
351. ld. at 283-90.
352. Id. at 332-36.
353. See Press Release, European Commission, Competition: Commission to market test
new proposals from Microsoft on interoperability (June 6, 2005),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/673&format-HTML&aged = l &l
anguage=EN&guiLanguage=en.
354. Microsoft can charge non-nominal prices only for protocol technology that is
innovative. See Press Release, European Commission, Competition: Statement of Objections to
Microsoft for non-compliance with March 2004 decision - frequently asked questions (Mar. 1,
2007), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/90 (last visited
Nov. 2, 2007)
355. See European Commission, supra note 353.
356. Microsoft challenged this interpretation before the CFI. See Case T-313/05, Microsoft
Corp. v. Comm'n, 2005 O.J. (C 257) 31 (not yet decided).
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enough, and which must fully give way to antitrust laws. It is not
entirely clear what is the required standard of innovativeness and how
it relates to the national trade secrets and patent laws, or the TTBER
definition of know-how. Inevitably, this was the source of another
dispute between the Commission and Microsoft. In March 2007,
nearly 3 years after the adoption of the Microsoft decision, the
Commission issued a Statement of Objections alleging that Microsoft
failed to comply with its decision by charging unreasonable prices for
the interoperability information.357 The Commission concluded that
there is no significant innovation in Microsoft's unpatented protocols
and, consequently, that license prices proposed by Microsoft are
unreasonable. 358 The protocols did not involve significant innovations
because "all of the described features were considered either to have
been Microsoft implementations of prior developments by others, or
to have been anticipated by prior developments and to be immediately
obvious minor extensions to that prior work., 359 It seems that the
required standard of innovativeness is akin to that required to obtain a
patent. Consequently, unless a trade secret embodies a patentable
invention, it does not merit any protection for the purpose of applying
Article 82 of the EC Treaty. This means that "know-how" which
merits protection when Article 81 is applied to it does not necessarily
merit protection if it is owned by a dominant company which
behavior is subject to Article 82. Thus, the Microsoft decision
significantly limits the ability of dominant companies to rely on trade
secrets laws to protect their innovation.
As is proven by the U.S. Settlement, which recognized that
Microsoft's interoperability information is protected by IP and
allowed introduction of security-based limitations on disclosures of
the information in question, elimination of Microsoft's trade secrets is
not the only means to achieve interoperability. 360 The Microsoft
decision is clearly an example of overeager application of antitrust
laws to intellectual property. It illustrates how, in the absence of the
EU standards of trade secret protection, the Commission coins trade
secret protection standards as it sees fit when applying antitrust laws
in a particular case. The CFI judgment did little to clarify the status of
357. Press Release, European Commission, Competition: Commission warns Microsoft of
further penalties over unreasonable pricing as interoperability information lacks significant
innovation (Mar. 1, 2007), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/269
(last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 192-93 (D.C. 2002).
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trade secrets under EU competition rules. The adoption of harmonized
trade secret protection laws at the EU level may be the only way to
create an environment of legal certainty necessary to stimulate
investment in innovation and diffusion of new technologies.
V. CONCLUSIONS
As with other forms of IP, trade secrets may give rise to
competitive concerns. Such concerns should be addressed by antitrust
enforcers; by no means should trade secret holders enjoy immunity
from antitrust scrutiny. Still, the role which trade secrets play as an
incentive to innovate means that antitrust enforcers should treat them
with a similar level of deference to that afforded to intellectual
property rights. Furthermore, the specific features of trade secrets,
such as the ease of misappropriation and the relatively limited scope
of protection they afford, should be taken into account when applying
antitrust rules. U.S. antitrust enforcers took these considerations into
account in cases involving trade secrets. By contrast, EU antitrust
enforcers questioned the merit of protecting trade secrets and treated
their uncertain status as an invitation to shape trade secret standards
for the purpose of application of antitrust law. The results of this
approach are not only at odds with national and international
standards of trade secret protection, but also internally incoherent.
The comparative analysis of trade secret laws and application of
antitrust laws to trade secrets in the U.S. and in the EU shows that the
legal environment surrounding trade secrets in the EU is troubling.
Different standards for trade secret protection in different member
states may discourage cross-border licensing of know-how. The
application of EU antitrust laws has increased the uncertainty
surrounding the status of trade secrets in Europe. It is unfortunate that
the Court of First Instance did not take the opportunity to clarify the
principles of competition law applicable to trade secrets in its
September 2007 Microsoft judgment. Insufficient protection of trade
secrets may forestall innovation and limit the dissemination of new
technologies. Harmonization of trade secret laws in Europe may be
necessary to achieve legal certainty and a higher degree of trade secret
protection. It would also be in line with EU efforts to create a good
regulatory environment for private R&D spending.361
361. A competitive IPR regime and better regulation in support of new technologies are an
important part of the EU's strategy to increase R&D spending. For the latest policy statements
on encouraging R&D spending and increasing the innovativeness of EU economy, see European
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Commission, Investing in European Research, http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-
research/index en.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
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